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The question of how corporate governance relates to firm performance has captured 
considerable attention from scholars, regulators, and market participants alike. The main 
objective pursued in this doctoral thesis is to examine the association between the quality 
of corporate governance and firm performance. We have measured this governance quality 
through two of the main channels: commercial indexes widely used as a proxy for corporate 
governance, and the degree of compliance with the recommendations of a country's code. 
The proposed models have been tested empirically for the Spanish, European and global 
setting to confirm if the assumed positive association does materialize. 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute the main body of this investigation. In Chapter 2, we 
investigate the governance-performance relationship using a leading CGR for a 
representative sample of the European landscape. In Chapter 3, we empirically examine 
whether higher levels of compliance with the recommendations included in the Spanish 
Unified Good Governance Code (UGGC) have an impact on firm performance using a 
unique panel data set of listed companies. Chapter 4 reflects the empirical study carried out 
to determine the probable association between the quality of corporate governance 
measured through the leading CGR and firm performance at a global scale.  
 
Overall, our results fail to support a consistent significant relationship between CGR and 
firm performance for our samples of large European and global firms respectively. Second, 
the results obtained in Chapter 3 point to a weak impact on the performance of companies 
from the quality of corporate governance when measured through a compliance with local 
code recommendations. These results hold for the overall proxy of corporate governance 
as well as for the proxies that represent the main governance categories or areas of 
recommendations.  
 
Keywords - corporate governance, commercial ratings, ISS Quickscore, firm performance, 
compliance with governance codes, legal tradition.  
La asociación entre calidad del gobierno corporativo y el desempeño de 
la empresa: evidencias para España, Europa y un escenario global 
Resumen: 
La pregunta de cómo el gobierno corporativo se relaciona con el desempeño de la empresa 
ha captado una considerable atención por parte de académicos, autoridades e inversores. 
El principal objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es examinar la asociación entre la calidad del 
gobierno corporativo y el desempeño de la empresa. Hemos medido esta calidad de 
gobernanza a través de dos de los principales indicadores: índices comerciales de gobierno 
corporativo ampliamente utilizados y por medio del grado de cumplimiento de las 
recomendaciones del código de un país. Los modelos propuestos han sido analizados 
empíricamente para el entorno español, europeo y mundial, para confirmar si la supuesta 
asociación positiva se materializa. 
Los capítulos 2, 3 y 4 constituyen el cuerpo principal de esta investigación. En el Capítulo 
2, investigamos la relación entre gobierno corporativo y desempeño de la empresa 
utilizando un índice comercial líder, para una muestra representativa del panorama 
europeo. En el Capítulo 3, examinamos empíricamente si altos niveles de cumplimiento de 
las recomendaciones incluidas en el Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno de España 
(UGGC) tienen un impacto en el desempeño de la empresa, utilizando un conjunto único 
de datos de panel de las compañías analizadas. El Capítulo 4 refleja el estudio empírico 
llevado a cabo para determinar la probable asociación entre la calidad del gobierno 
corporativo medido a través del índice comercial líder y el desempeño de la empresa a 
escala global. 
En general, nuestros resultados no validan una relación significativa y consistente entre el 
índice comercial de gobierno corporativo y el desempeño de la empresa para nuestras 
muestras de grandes empresas europeas y globales. En segundo lugar, los resultados 
obtenidos en el Capítulo 3 apuntan a un impacto débil en el desempeño de las empresas 
cuando la calidad del gobierno corporativo se mide a través del cumplimiento de las 
recomendaciones del código local. Estos resultados son válidos tanto para el indicador 
general de gobierno corporativo, como para los indicadores parciales que representan las 
principales categorías de gobernanza o áreas de recomendaciones. 
Palabras clave: gobierno corporativo, índices comerciales, ISS Quickscore, desempeño 
de la empresa, cumplimiento de los códigos de gobernanza, tradición legal. 
L'associació entre qualitat del govern corporatiu i acompliment 
empresarial: evidències d'Espanya, Europa i un entorn global 
 
Resum: 
La qüestió de com el govern corporatiu es relaciona amb el desenvolupament de l’empresa 
ha captat una considerable atenció dels acadèmics, els reguladors i els inversors. L'objectiu 
principal que es persegueix en aquesta tesi doctoral és examinar la relació entre la qualitat 
del govern corporatiu i el rendiment de l'empresa. Hem mesurat aquesta qualitat de govern 
mitjançant dos dels principals indicadors: els índexs comercials àmpliament utilitzats i el 
grau de compliment de les recomanacions del codi d'un país. Els models proposats han 
estat provats empíricament per a l'entorn espanyol, europeu i global per confirmar si es 
materialitza la suposada associació positiva. 
Els capítols 2, 3 i 4 constitueixen el cos principal d'aquesta investigació. En el capítol 2, 
investiguem la relació entre govern corporatiu i desenvolupament de l’empresa utilitzant 
un índex comercial de govern corporatiu líder per a una mostra representativa del paisatge 
europeu. En el capítol 3, examinem empíricament si els nivells més alts de compliment de 
les recomanacions incloses en el Codi Unificat de Bon Govern (UGGC) tenen un impacte 
en el rendiment de l'empresa mitjançant un conjunt únic de dades de panell d'empreses 
cotitzades. El capítol 4 reflecteix l'estudi empíric realitzat per determinar la possible 
associació entre la qualitat del govern corporatiu mesurada a través de l’índex comercial 
líder i el rendiment de la companyia a escala global. 
En general, els nostres resultats no validen una relació significativa i consistent entre 
l’índex comercial i el desenvolupament de l’empesa per a las nostras mostras de grans 
empreses europees i mundials. En segon lloc, els resultats obtinguts en el capítol 3 apunten 
a un impacte feble en el desenvolupament de les empreses de la qualitat del govern 
corporatiu quan aquesta es mesura mitjançant el compliment de les recomanacions del codi 
local. Aquests resultats es refereixen tant a l’indicador general de govern corporatiu com 
als indicadors parcials de les principals categories de governança o àrees de recomanacions. 
 
Paraules clau: govern corporatiu, classificacions comercials, ISS Quickscore, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance has captured a lot of media attention and emerged as a subject of 
public policy discussion, particularly since the Enron scandal erupted in the US in the early 
2000´s, and more recently due to the global financial downturn. In addition, the swift 
globalization trend and cross-country investments have amplified the claim for common 
standards on corporate governance assessment. In light of this, governance indicators are 
becoming increasingly important for firms in their quest to improve their performance and 
secure their appeal for global investors. Commonly, investors perceive well-governed 
companies to be better investments than poorly governed ones. Based on agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the relation between quality of governance and firm 
performance is quite straightforward. Consequently, it has become common for investors 
to incorporate corporate governance issues when making investment decisions. 
This increase in the regulation of corporate governance and the special importance that 
economic actors attach to this aspect have been followed by a growing interest in the study 
of the factors that most influence its quality. Moreover, these developments have raised a 
number of important questions about the linkages between the effectiveness of corporate 
governance policies and firm performance, becoming an area of intense study in the 
economics and finance community during the past decade.  
Most of the works that have investigated the association between governance and firm 
performance refer to two predominant lines of research relying either on the use of single 
governance provisions or on academic governance indexes. Overall, these studies have 
yielded non-conclusive results about a systematic relation between the indexes and 
performance. Conversely, there is rather limited empirical literature that examines this 
association using commercial governance ratings (CGR) as a proxy for corporate 
governance, or studies that examine the impact on firm performance from compliance with 
a complete set of official governance guidelines. Remarkably, this is happening at a time 
when both proxies of quality of governance have gained notorious approval among market 
participants and regulators. 
Therefore, this investigation intends to contribute to this area of research by 1) shedding 
light on the usefulness and reliability of CGR in their association with firm performance, 
and 2) by investigating the impact on performance from compliance with the local 
governance codes. This is the main objective pursued in this doctoral thesis. 
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The motivation of this study is justified by the practical importance of the subject: to 
improve corporate governance structures and practices. In addition, there is a growing 
demand for reliable measures of corporate governance that should lead to better firm 
performance while safeguarding investors’ interests (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). 
On one hand, we acknowledge the growing popularity among investors of CGR developed 
by a number of consultant agencies led by the Institutional Shareholders Service (ISS) as 
proxy for quality of corporate governance. These CGR are replacing the daunting task of 
gathering and analyzing all available information to make a sound evaluation of 
management and corporate practices. However, their reliability as effective measures of 
corporate governance continues to be questioned. 
On the other hand, while in the 1990’s only few countries had governance codes, following 
the publication of the influential 1992 Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best Governance 
Practices in the UK, twenty years later more than 110 countries and international 
organizations have issued one or several codes of governance. Through adherence to this 
soft legislation, governments have sought to level the ground for governance practices as 
well as compliance with local codes of governance aim to fulfill this necessity. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the governance-performance relationship using a leading 
commercial governance index for a representative sample of the European landscape. It is 
expected that companies with higher quality of governance show stronger performance. 
The use of a non-US sample allows us to extend prior US evidence. We also aim to 
contribute to the research on the use of CGR as predictors of firm performance by providing 
new evidence obtained with the latest versions available of leading CGR. Our study is 
complimentary to the ongoing scholarly debate over whether governance attributes are 
largely determined by country factors or by firm practices. We investigate the relationship 
between governance rating and firm performance using multivariate regression analysis. 
As it has been widely documented in the corporate governance literature (La Porta et al., 
1998), there is a fundamental difference between common-law jurisdictions (mainly 
identified with the Anglo-Saxon governance systems), where shareholders’ perspectives 
rule, and the continental Europe governance civil-law model, where broader stakeholders’ 
perspectives are shared and governance recommendations issued at the country level are 
largely voluntary. We exploit this institutional diversity in our sample, based on the 
comparison between the civil-law and the common-law models, which has been the focus 
of corporate governance researchers.  
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In Chapter 3, we empirically examine whether higher levels of compliance with the 
recommendations included in the Spanish Unified Good Governance Code (UGGC) have 
an impact on firm performance using a unique hand-collected panel data set of 145 listed 
companies for the research period between 2007 and 2012. We address the significance of 
compliance with the Spanish UGGC by answering the question of whether differences in 
these compliance ratios can help to explain variations in performance that have not been 
captured by other relevant characteristics of the firm. Although the available evidence is 
rather mixed, we expect a positive relationship between compliance with the UGGC and 
performance. The use of dynamic panel data and the introduction in our models of a larger 
set of control variables and particularly lagged dependent variables constitute an important 
contribution. 
We find that, in spite of the increasing compliance trend, there is no conclusive evidence 
that adherence to the UGGC guidelines is a performance relevant factor. Therefore, our 
findings would further support the lack of consensus in this line of research regarding the 
true impact of compliance with globally disseminated codes of best corporate governance 
practices on firm performance.  
Chapter 4 reflects the empirical study carried out to determine the probable association 
between the quality of corporate governance measured through a world leading CGR and 
the performance of the company. We extend and refine the analysis conducted in Chapter 
2 focused on the European level, to the global scale. There are only few cross-country 
investigations and almost all of them test this relationship using their self-constructed 
governance ratings. This is, to our knowledge, the second study that documents the 
relationship between a commercial rating and firm performance in a global setting, 
following Krafft et al. (2014). 
We provide new evidence obtained by using a sample of 1103 firms from the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) 1200 Global Index. We proxy for governance risk by using the latest 
available version of leading ISS governance ratings. Our attention has been addressed to 
two relevant issues. First, to test how this relationship applies to our overall global 
standardized dataset, and secondly, to investigate if there is any influence from legal 
tradition that could partially explain this relationship. Similar to our investigation in 
Chapter 2 for a European background, we show, however, that the results are maintained 
across the main legal origin groups.  
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Overall, a distinctive feature of our research is that, compared to most of prior research 
(Aggarwal et al., 2009; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009) that used a single indicator of 
performance, we use several metrics in order to report sounder results. We also do not limit 
our study to the aggregate governance scores, as is typical in the literature, but also address 
the scores of main governance sub-indexes (Chapters 2 and 4) and areas of governance 
recommendations (Chapter 3). Such an approach should offer a more complete and precise 
picture of the relationship between our governance proxies and firm performance. Finally, 
another main distinction in our investigation is that we control for past performance. This 








Chapter 2. Evaluating the link between commercial governance ratings and firm 
performance in a cross-European setting1 
2.1. Abstract 
Purpose - This paper explores the ability of commercial governance ratings to predict firm 
performance.  
Design/methodology/approach - Based on the review of the corporate governance 
literature we pose five hypotheses on the relationship between commercial governance 
ratings and firm performance. Then, we test these hypotheses for the latest version of the 
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) index (Quickscore) with a sample of firms 
formed by the constituents of the Standard and Poor’s Europe 350 stock market index.  
Findings - We have not found a consistent significant relationship between Quickscore 
ratings and firm performance. This main result holds across a variety of checks.   
Research limitations/implications - Some of the additional analyses are conducted with 
rather small samples. The results of these analyses have to be carefully taken. 
Recommendations for further research are offered. 
Practical implications - Our results call into question the usefulness of commercial 
governance ratings, marketed by influential consultant companies, and which are becoming 
increasingly popular among investors, as reliable predictors of firm performance. 
Originality/value - Despite an increasing body of research on the use of commercial 
governance ratings as predictors of firm performance, the available research is heavily 
concentrated in the US market. No previous study has explored this relationship using the 
recently developed ISS index Quickscore in a cross-European setting. The use of a cross-
country sample of companies allows us to address the impact of institutional factors on the 
commercial governance ratings-firm performance relationship. Moreover, we do not limit 
our study to the overall scores of the index but examine also the partial scores (pillars) which 
intend to assess specific dimensions of governance. This makes the evaluation of the 
relationship more complex and challenging.   
Keywords - corporate governance, commercial ratings, ISS Quickscore, firm performance. 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Núñez Izquierdo, M. and Garcia-Blandon, J. (2017). “Evaluating the link between commercial 
governance ratings and firm performance in a cross-European setting”, Management Decision, 55, 2089-2110. 
 





Corporate governance has captured a lot of media attention and emerged as a subject of 
public policy discussion, particularly since the Enron scandal erupted in the US in the early 
2000´s and, more recently, due to the global financial crisis and the Volkswagen fraud. In 
parallel with this, corporate governance has become an area of intense study in the 
economics and finance community during the past decade. In light of this, governance 
indicators are becoming increasingly important for firms in their quest to improve external 
financing conditions. Furthermore, evidence from surveys conducted by consulting firm 
McKinsey & Co. showed that over 75% of investors are willing to pay a premium for shares 
of firms with high governance standards. These results imply that investors perceive well-
governed companies to be better investments than poorly governed ones. Consequently, it 
has become common for investors to incorporate corporate governance issues when making 
investment decisions.  
With this aim, commercial governance ratings (CGR) are designed to replace the daunting 
task of gathering and analyzing all available information to make a sound evaluation of 
management and corporate practices. Thus, during the past decade, a growing market for 
CGR and proxy voting advisers has emerged, led by agencies such as Institutional 
Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Governance Metrics International (GMI). 
While the impact of corporate governance on firm performance has been extensively studied 
by management and finance scholars, very limited attention has been given to the use of 
CGR as a proxy for corporate governance. As pointed out by Bhagat et al. (2008, pg. 1818), 
“the more compelling reason for the success of indexes is the elegant simplicity of having 
one summary number for capturing the multiple dimensionality of governance.” This paper 
is intended to help fill this gap by shedding light on the usefulness and reliability of CGR to 
investors and market participants.  
We investigate the ability of CGR to predict firm performance. Our sample of companies 
includes the constituents of the Standard and Poor´s Europe 350 Index that have been 
previously analyzed by ISS. We focus on the ISS Quickscore governance index (hereinafter 
QUICKSCORE), as it currently stands as the leading commercial database in terms of 
coverage (number of firms and markets) available to generate robust and generalizable 
quantitative results. We investigate the relationship between CGR and firm performance 
using multivariate regression analysis. As in most previous related studies, we use return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as proxies  of  performance.  Additionally, a key 
 




valuation indicator, the Tobin's Q, is also used.2 It is expected that companies with higher 
governance risk (higher QUICKSCORE ratings) show weaker performance, after accounting 
for the impact of control variables. If this were not so, we might question these ratings as 
reliable predictors of performance. Moreover, unlike most prior research, we do not limit 
our study to the aggregate governance score but also address the scores of main governance 
sub-indexes (pillars), such as board structure, compensation, shareholder rights or audit 
practices. Such an approach should offer a more complete and precise picture of the 
relationship between CGR and firm performance.  
The use of a non-US sample allows us to extend prior US evidence. Contrary to most 
previous studies on this subject that handle relatively homogeneous US companies’ datasets, 
we use a broad sample of European companies. Given the importance of the institutional 
setting on governance issues, US evidence should not be directly extrapolated to other 
countries (Aggarwal et al., 2007). As it has been widely documented in the corporate 
governance literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1998), there is a 
fundamental difference between common-law jurisdictions (mainly identified with the 
Anglo-Saxon governance systems), where shareholders’ perspectives rule, and the 
continental Europe governance civil-law model, where broader stakeholders’ perspectives 
are shared and governance recommendations issued at the country level are largely 
voluntary.  
On the second hand, our multi country sample allows us to address how the institutional 
setting affects the issue investigated, adding statistical power to our results. This is due to 
the different regulatory requirements across countries that should lead to more variation in 
the ratings. We exploit this institutional diversity in our sample following Bauer et al.’s 
(2003) approach, based on the comparison between the civil-law and the common-law 
models, which has been the focus of corporate governance researchers in the European 
context. Despite recent documented convergence in corporate governance between 
continental Europe and the UK and Ireland (Wójcik, 2006), the European governance setting 
is still diverse, with a concentrated ownership regime presented in various degrees in 
continental Europe. Overall, our emphasis is on the different governance qualities between 
these two broad European regions when measured by CGR, and not on the analysis of the 
different governance systems across countries.  
                                                          
2Within this study, we refer indistinctively to TOBINQ, ROA and ROE as firm-level performance indicators. 
 
 




The motivation of this study relies on the sound and growing demand for reliable measures 
of corporate governance that should lead to better firm performance while safeguarding 
investors’ interests (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). The increasingly popular CGR aim to 
fulfill this necessity. However, in keeping with the growing success of CGR among 
investors and market participants, their reliability as effective measures of corporate 
governance has emerged as a meaningful research question in the academic field. While 
there are already some papers addressing this issue (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Cheng and 
Wu, 2006), the lack of consensus on the trustworthiness of CGR welcomes further research 
on this issue. Moreover, it should be noted that research periods in most prior studies end at 
the beginning of this century. Since both, the importance of corporate governance issues for 
firms and market participants as well as the use, availability and complexity of CGR have 
dramatically changed during the last two decades, results reported by prior studies need to 
be updated.  
We aim to contribute to the research on the use of CGR as predictors of firm performance 
by providing new evidence obtained with the latest version available of QUICKSCORE (ISS 
Quickscore 2.0). This is, to our knowledge, the second study using this specific rating. In a 
prior study with a limited sample of US firms, Gherghina et al. (2014), reported the lack of 
a statistically significant relationship with the companies’ value. While our research shares 
some similarities with Gherghina et al. (2014), unlike them, we investigate a large sample 
of firms from 16 European countries following a cross-regional approach. According to 
Doidge et al. (2007), country characteristics explain a much larger share of the variance in 
governance ratings than firm characteristics. Our study is complimentary to the ongoing 
scholarly debate over whether governance attributes are largely determined by country 
factors or by firm practices. Furthermore, we incorporate the companies´ ownership 
structure as a control variable, given its importance in the analysis of the influence of 
governance on performance. As stated by Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009), different 
ownership structures demand different governance practices. Finally, while most prior 
research (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Daines et al., 2010; Gherghina et al., 2014) used a single 
indicator of performance, we use several metrics in order to report sounder results. 
In anticipation of our results, we do not find a consistent significant relationship between 
CGR and firm performance. This result holds for the overall rating of corporate governance 
as well as for the segmented ratings. Therefore, our findings call into question the usefulness 
of CGR marketed by influential consultant companies as predictors of performance. 
 




According to our findings, investors should take decisions based on CGR only with due 
reservations. Furthermore, our results should also encourage the providers of CGR to 
investigate on the causes of this lack of relationship in order to produce more accurate 
ratings.   
The study proceeds as follows. We review prior literature on the relationship between 
governance ratings and performance. The paper continues with a description of the 
methodology. Finally, we present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis as well as 
conclusions and implications drawn from these results. 
2.3. Review of the literature  
In this section, we review the literature on the governance ratings-firm performance 
relationship. Prior studies can be classified by the type of governance ratings used, into 
studies which construct their own governance indexes (academic indexes) and those using 
governance metrics developed by rating agencies. 
In a well-known example of the first approach, Gompers et al. (2003) constructed an index 
of governance quality (G-index) using data provided by the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). The authors concluded that the value of good corporate 
governance (lower G-index) is reflected in equity prices. They also found a high correlation 
between the G-index and several measures of firm performance. Their findings support the 
hypothesis that well-governed companies outperform poorly governed firms. Following 
Gompers et al. (2003), but using a smaller set of governance provisions resulting in the 
entrenchment rating (labeled E-index), Bebchuk et al. (2009) found a negative and 
significant relationship between the E-index level and firm valuation as well as abnormal 
stock returns. Similarly, Larcker and Richardson (2007), using principal components 
analysis (PCA) applied to US companies, reported a positive and significant relationship 
between academic governance indexes and firm performance. As the aforementioned 
studies conducted with US datasets, studies with non-US samples have produced similar 
results. Drobetz et al. (2003) built their own governance rating to study German firms, where 
worker representatives are usually a powerful voice on corporate supervisory boards and 
concluded that superior governance standards positively impact performance. Later on, 
Klapper and Love (2004) built an average governance index based on the Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) report, and observed strong correlation between governance and 
performance for the 25 emerging economies analyzed. Finally, similar studies with samples 
 




of British (Padgett and Shabbir, 2005), Swiss (Beiner et al., 2006) and Greek (Toudas and 
Karathanassis, 2007) firms, have also reported a significant direct relationship between the 
quality of governance as measured by academic ratings, and performance. 
While the initial incursion into building governance ratings was for academic analysis, it 
has quickly evolved into an array of CGR marketed to investors. A number of organizations, 
including major credit rating companies (Standard and Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch) as well 
as voting proxy companies such as ISS and GMI, have continued to develop governance 
ratings. Contrary to academic ratings, which are more rigid and narrow in scope, main CGR 
evaluate the ratings against the industry and average company size. In addition, the 
methodology and data is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in governance practices in 
the country and/or sectors, and they use multiple data sources.  
Prior studies using CGR have been generally conducted with US samples. Brown and Caylor 
(2006) extended Gompers et al. (2003) academic governance rating, by developing a more 
complete measure of corporate governance using data provided by ISS. Their Gov-Score 
index included 51 governance factors divided into eight main categories and covered a larger 
database. They then related Gov-Score to operating performance, valuation and dividend 
payouts for more than 2000 US firms, showing a positive and significant relationship 
between governance scores and these indicators. Later on, Cheng and Wu (2006) studied 
the relationship between ISS Corporate Governance Quotient Index (CGQ) and total 
shareholders’ return (raw and industry adjusted) for a large sample of US firms. They 
showed that firms gaining positive governance momentum, defined as an improvement in 
the overall quality of corporate governance, outperformed the other pool of firms. 
Furthermore, Aggarwal et al. (2007) built a pair of governance indexes based on CGQ to 
compare the governance of foreign companies and US firms. They found that non-US firms 
with better governance than a match sample of US firms have higher valuation than non-US 
firms with weaker governance.  
However, other papers have failed to report a significant relationship between CGR and 
performance. Hence, Epps and Cereola (2008) used the CGQ for large US companies and 
found no evidence linking CGR and operating performance. Afterwards, Daines et al. 
(2010) built a broad comparison of leading CGR, including ISS and GMI ratings, 
establishing an association with several firm valuation and operating performance metrics 
for US firms. Their findings yield consistent weak results about a systematic relation 
between the indexes and performance. More recently, Gherghina et al. (2014) reported a 
 




lack of a statistically significant relationship between ISS CGR and company value for a 
limited US large firms sample. 
As far as research conducted within Europe, which is the focus of this paper, there are also 
mixed results. Some studies show that CGR have a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance, as reflected by Hitz and Lehmann (2015) with a sample of UK and German 
companies, and Renders et al. (2010) on a set of European companies. Conversely, Bauer et 
al. (2003) failed to document a consistent significant relationship between CGR and 
performance for distinct UK and European Monetary Union datasets.  
In summary, as more companies are required to comply with governance best practices 
codes, the use of CGR to measure this compliance is becoming increasingly popular. In 
addition, the relationship between CGR and firm performance has emerged as an important 
line of research. However, despite the growing attention devoted to this topic, prior studies 
do not agree on the nature of this relationship. Moreover, relatively few studies have been 
conducted on a cross-national basis. Following our discussion in the introductory section, 
our investigation intends to fill this gap. 
2.4. Research methodology 
2.4.1. Hypotheses  
Based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we should observe a direct link 
between governance and firm performance. Well-governed firms exhibit higher investors’ 
confidence on the back of higher management’s monitoring and disciplining. As a result, 
they are supposed to carry lower risk and enjoy lower cost of capital, which should translate 
into higher valuation and performance.  
CGR provide an observable measure of the unobservable concept of corporate governance. 
As discussed in the review of the literature, CGR are becoming an important tool for 
measuring the quality of governance. Hence, firms that rank better on these ratings should 
display stronger economic performance. We address the relevance of CGR by answering 
the question of whether differences in these ratings can help to explain variations in 
performance which have not been captured by other relevant characteristics of the firm. Due 
to the nature of QUICKSCORE, where a high score represents higher governance risk (lower 
governance quality), we hypothesize: 
 
 




Hypothesis 1. Higher governance risk, in accordance with QUICKSCORE is negatively 
and significantly associated with performance. 
 
Given that our governance index is an aggregate metric based on four main corporate 
governance categories or pillars, the fact that Hypothesis 1 holds for the index does not 
necessarily mean that it will hold true for each of the pillars and viceversa. We agree with 
ISS in grouping all the factors analyzed into these four main pillars, as they represent the 
most critical areas in relation to a successful corporate governance. Next, we develop the 
hypotheses for the four pillars.   
In light of the prominent role and important transformation suffered by the board of directors 
within past decades, numerous studies have focused on the relation between several 
attributes of the board (size, composition, practices) and firm performance (Yermack, 1996; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). As this board structure (BOARDST) pillar of QUICKSCORE 
gathers more than 50 attributes of the board of directors, including the most relevant ones 
covered in prior research, we believe that it should reveal the expected relationship between 
this governance category and performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.1.  Higher governance risk related to poor board structure practices 
(BOARDST) is negatively and significantly associated with 
performance. 
 
An important insight shared by most researchers is that management decisions appear to be 
influenced by compensation to a large extent. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mehran 
(1995), among others, have provided evidence supporting a strong impact of management 
compensation practices on performance. We believe that the compensation (COMPENS) 
category within QUICKSCORE, based on the analysis of a great deal of compensation 
attributes, should constitute a valid proxy to examine the relationship between this important 
area of governance and performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.2.  Higher governance risk related to poor compensation practices 
(COMPENS) is negatively and significantly associated with 
performance. 
 




The importance of shareholders’ protection for the future of the company has been widely 
documented in the literature. According to Gompers et al. (2003), firms characterized by 
stronger shareholders’ rights exhibit a superior performance. In addition, Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) also concluded that there is a negative and significant relationship between the level 
of management entrenchment and both firm valuation and market returns. We rely on the 
shareholder rights (SHRIGHTS) category within QUICKSCORE as a broad representation 
of the level of protection of shareholders’ rights, and as such, we study its impact on 
performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.3.  Higher governance risk related to poor shareholder rights practices 
(SHRIGHTS) is negatively and significantly associated with 
performance. 
 
Regarding the last category, prior studies have documented an increasing importance of 
audit and accounting practices on performance, even though no conclusive evidence has 
been found. We highlight the works of Brown and Caylor (2005) and Bowen et al. (2008) 
on this subject. As the audit (AUDIT) category within QUICKSCORE covers the most 
important attributes of accounting and auditing practices stressed in the literature, we use it 
as a proxy to analyze the relationship between this governance category and performance. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.4.   Higher governance risk related to poor Audit practices (AUDIT) is 
negatively and significantly associated with performance. 
2.4.2. Research design 
In order to highlight the relationship between CGR and performance, we estimate the model 
given by Equation (1) below with ordinary least squares.  
 
TOBINQ/ROA/ROE i = α + βCGR i + γ Z i + ε i  (1) 
 
Where we use TOBINQ, ROA and ROE (all adjusted at the sector level), as proxies of 
performance. Our main variable of interest (CGR) is the QUICKSCORE, although we also 
test the four partial pillars of the index: BOARDST, COMPENS, SHRIGHTS and AUDIT. 
 




Finally, we also include the usual control variables (Z) used in prior research (Yermack, 
1996; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
2.4.2.1. Proxies for Performance 
Empirical research on governance uses either market-based measures or accounting ratios 
to assess the relationship with performance. As pointed out by Dalton et al. (2003) in a meta-
analysis of corporate governance literature, there is a lack of consensus about the best 
measure of performance to investigate this relationship. However, following Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008), we focus on accounting-based metrics. Contrary to stock market metrics, 
accounting ones are not tainted by possible anticipation from investors. To test the proposed 
hypotheses, Equation (1) is taken as a starting point for the assessment of the models. We 
use the TOBINQ (our main proxy of performance) as the dependent variable. However, we 
also use ROA and ROE as alternative measurements of performance. 
As certain characteristics of the industry may play a critical role in the scores of governance 
indexes (Bauer et al., 2003; Gompers et al., 2003), we adjust our performance variables by 
the industry medians, to filter out the potential industry-specific effects.  We follow 
Eisenberg et al.’s (1998) approach for this calculation and define the sector-adjusted 
performance variables as the square-root transformation of the difference between the firm´s 
performance and the industry´s median for that metric.  
TOBINQ 
We test whether poorly governed firms according to QUICKSCORE, ceteris paribus tend to 
have weaker performance. A pure Tobin’s Q measures the quotient of the market value of 
assets divided by the replacement value of these same assets. We follow a simplification of 
this measure commonly used in the finance literature (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; La Porta 
et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2003), to ensure maximum data availability. Hence, we measure 
TOBINQ as the sum of the book value of total assets plus the market value of common equity 
minus the sum of the book value of common equity and deferred taxes, over the book value 
of total assets. The market value of equity is the price of the share multiplied by the total 
common shares outstanding, while the replacement value of assets is represented by the 
book value of the total assets. All book values for fiscal year t are matched with the market 









Return on assets is a measure of operating performance, which suggests the level of 
profitability that the company obtains from its assets. Similar to prior research (Larcker and 
Richardson, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), we calculate ROA as operating income divided 
by the book value of total assets.  
ROE 
Return on equity is another usual measure of performance, which shows the level of 
profitability the company obtains from money invested by common shareholders. As is 
usual in the corporate governance literature (Brown and Caylor, 2005; Epps and Cereola, 
2008), we calculate ROE as income before extraordinary items available for common equity 
divided by the book value of common equity. 
2.4.2.2. Governance ratings: Quickscore and pillars 
QUICKSCORE was launched in 2013, with the index now in its third version (Quickscore 
3.0, as of 2015). This aggregate index rests on the analysis of four major governance pillars: 
(1) board structure (BOARDST), (2) compensation (COMPENS), (3) shareholder rights 
(SHRIGHTS), and (4) audit practices (AUDIT). Each pillar rating is based on ISS’s ranking 
of the various subcategories underlying each pillar and their corresponding governance 
factors, based on an examination of the firm´s regulatory filings, annual reports, 
prospectuses, as well as company´s websites and press releases. Equation (1) includes five 
governance variables to account for the aggregate as well as for the four partial governance 
ratings listed above.  
The ISS approach is to assign discrete weights to each attribute, acknowledging that some 
factors should have a heavier weight on the index than others. It also calibrates the weights 
assigned to corporate governance factors as a function of their correlations with firm’s prior 
performance. To aggregate these weights, it transforms the scores into a numeric, decile-
based scale from 1 to 10 for each pillar which indicates a firm’s governance risk. The last 
step in the process is a combination of the four pillar scores into a single one with a score of 
1 indicating low governance risk relative to their index, and conversely, a score of 10 
indicating relatively high governance risk. While the factors used to produce a company's 
rating are public, there is a critical confidentiality component of the methodology used in 
 




gathering, weighting, and analyzing information that is not revealed and is treated as 
intellectual property. Further information can be found in the brochures released by ISS.3 
2.4.2.3. Control Variables  
Both corporate governance and performance are likely to correlate with other critical firm 
metrics. One way to mitigate the problem of possible endogeneity is to add an appropriate 
set of control variables. Therefore, consistent with prior studies (Yermack, 1996; Klapper 
and Love, 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2007), we include the following control variables: size, 
age, growth and leverage.  
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), large firms are more prone to deal with greater agency problems on 
the back of larger free cash flows. However, they also tend to have easier access to capital 
markets joined by the cost-effective benefits of economies of scale, and as such, should 
show a better performance. We define firm age (AGE) as the number of years passed since 
the year of incorporation (logarithmic values). Consistent with Fama and French (2004), 
performance is likely to deteriorate at the margin in older firms, presumably due to a 
worsening of corporate governance features, among other factors. Furthermore, there is 
considerable literature emphasizing the positive effects of growth opportunities, as 
companies with solid growth prospects (GROWTH) usually hire better management teams 
and show higher performance (Core et al., 1999). We follow Klapper and Love (2004) and 
use the average annual sales growth over the past three years. Finally, we include financial 
leverage (LEVER), as debt service commitment should impose a higher degree of 
accountability to management teams, deterring managers from making poor investment 
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
As a distinction from the bulk of prior related studies, and in order to increase the robustness 
of our results, we include ownership concentration as a control variable. We capture the 
ownership effect with a variable labeled (OWNCONC), which shows the portion of 
outstanding shares owned by top holding groups. A successful governance system relies on 
some combination of concentrated ownership and legal protection of investors (La Porta et 
al., 1998). However, there are both costs and benefits associated with ownership 
concentration. As stated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pg. 739), “concentrated ownership 
                                                          
3 See ISS Quickscore 3.0, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/investment-tools-data/quickscore/ 
(last visited February, 2018) 
 




has its costs as well, which can be best described as potential expropriation by large investors 
of other investors and stakeholders in the firm”. Furthermore, many economists that have 
investigated the impact of ownership structure on performance (Morck et al., 1988; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; O’Connell and Cramer, 2010) adhere to this notion. Hence, 
consistent with this wealth expropriation hypothesis, we predict a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and performance, as it becomes difficult to remove 
managers that act opportunistically in their own benefit or on behalf of controlling 
shareholders. We compile ownership information for the firms in the sample from S&P 
Capital IQ database for the year 2015.4 We use Demsetz and Villalonga’s (2001) proxy for 
this metric and add up the holdings of the five largest shareholders to determine the 
ownership concentration for each company. As a caveat, we make no distinction between 
inside and outside ownership, so a portion of these large shareholders could well be part of 
management, or affiliated management. We also ignore the identity of controlling 
shareholders.  
For the estimation of each model, we also include the dependent variable one-year lagged 
as an independent variable. According to Daines et al. (2010), current performance 
significantly affects future performance. We use fiscal year information to compute all the 
performance and control variables. Similar to prior work, we winsorize control variables (at 
the top and bottom one percent) to neutralize the impact of possible spurious outliers. As 
stated by Gompers et al. (2003), the governance practices of a firm are rather endogenous, 
so it is difficult to infer causal direction. In addition, since our governance data is comprised 
of only one year, we cannot address the issue of causality. 
Finally, after the main analysis conducted with the whole sample, we also perform 
segmented analyses to explore the validity of these hypotheses for our two distinctive 
European regions: the common-law or Anglo-Saxon region, and the civil-law or continental 
Europe region.  
2.4.3. Dataset  
To accomplish our goal, the study takes the data of 310 constituents of Standard and Poor´s 
Europe 350 Stock Market Index (SP350) for which QUICKSCORE was available. The index 
covers 350 large capitalization companies across 16 major European countries, comprising 
                                                          
4 Ownership concentration information for years 2013-14 was not available in Capital IQ database. Given the low degree 
of historic changes in this indicator over short term periods, we use available 2015 data as a proxy. 
 




approximately 70% of the market capitalization of the region. This study uses primary data 
(governance variables) released in 2013. All dependent variables in Equation (1) are moved 
forward one year (2014) to reduce endogeneity without significantly upsetting the 
explanatory power of regressions. As happens in practice, implementation of good 
governance recommendations may have some delayed effect on the performance of the 
company. Control variables refer to 2014, except the lagged performance control variables. 
Table 1 presents a summary of all the variable names, codes, brief descriptions, and sources 
of data. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
We analyze companies by industry, using the Industry Classification Benchmark prepared 
by FTSE that comprises 10 major industries. In line with academic consensus, banking and 
financial companies (60 companies), have been excluded from the sample based on their 
distinctive governance structures and accounting practices. A further 13 companies were 
dropped due to the lack of financial data. The final sample consists of 237 companies, 
corresponding to 76.5% of our initial set of companies. These firms operate in a variety of 
industries: Communications (24), Consumer Discretionary (44), Consumer Staples (32), 
Energy (14), Health Care (16), Industrials (44), Materials (31), Technology (14) and Utilities 
(18), as shown in Table 2. 
We follow ISS´s regional break down for Europe, to allow comparison within markets where 
governance practices are similar. However, we are aware of the fact that the number of 
factors included by ISS to compute the scores vary among these sub-regions. As explained 
previously, we exploit this institutional diversity of our sample studying the impact of 
governance on performance through a comparison between the Anglo-Saxon (AS) and the 
continental Europe (CE) regions. As reflected in Table 2, out of the 237 companies, 68 
(corresponding to 28.7%) are from the UK and Ireland, which are grouped in the AS region. 
The other 169 companies (corresponding to 71.3%), re-grouped in the CE region, are 
originally grouped as followed: 49 from the Germanic sub-region (Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland), 34 from the Nordic sub-region (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), 23 
from the Southern sub-region (Italy, Spain and Greece), and 63 from the Western sub-region 
(Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and France).  
Insert Table 2 around here 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the overall dataset while Tables 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 display these statistics for the AS and CE regions, respectively. The results 
 




indicate that there is medium overall quality of governance practices among the large 
European companies in our dataset (corresponding to a mean QUICKSCORE of 5.04). 
BOARDST, COMPENS, and SHRIGHTS pillars have similar results with means in the 4.47-
4.95 range. Companies do best in AUDIT practices with a median of 1 (highest quality) for 
the overall dataset and also for all the regions, highlighting the low clout of this governance 
category as a distinctive or informative variable. The average firm size is $9.7 billion and 
the average leverage ratio is 24.8%. Furthermore, the average TOBINQ, ROA, and ROE are 
0.15, 0.66% and 1.28% respectively. On average the five largest shareholders control 34.3% 
of shares. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
The ratings by the two major regions reveal some degree of diversity. Companies in the AS 
region lead in terms of overall governance quality with a mean QUICKSCORE of 4.16 (5.39 
for the CE region). We gain more insight into the diversity of corporate governance by 
examining the four governance pillars. Again, the AS region leads in all four pillars. 
Consistent with prior literature, these findings somehow confirm the established notion of 
certain leadership of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance as highlighted by 
La Porta et al. (1998).  
The 0.405 TOBINQ for the AS region, exceeds the -0.031 TOBINQ for the CE region, 
reflecting a higher firm-value setting for the AS region. The average ROA reaches 1.77 for 
the AS region, showing the CE region again as a laggard with -0.033. Likewise, the AS 
region ROE leads by a large margin with 4.8, with the CE region once again lagging with a 
low -0.206 score. Overall, these metrics also reflect clear leadership for the AS region in 
terms of firm performance.  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show that ownership concentration varies by legal origin. The lowest 
average concentration measure corresponds to the AS region with 28.1 percent (35.9% in 
the CE region). This is consistent with La Porta et al. (2002), who argued that companies in 
common-law tradition countries tend to have a lower level of ownership concentration in 
response to stronger legal protection to investors. Overall, there is no large regional 
differences in terms of age or size. The AS region clearly leads in terms of growth potential 
and exhibits a 27.2% level of leverage (23.7% for the CE region). 
Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 around here 
Table 4 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in our model. As expected, 
QUICKSCORE is correlated with the four main governance pillars (BOARDST, COMPENS, 
 




SHRIGHTS and AUDIT). We also analyze the correlation between each pair of pillars to 
rule out any potential substitution effects between governance main features. No significant 
negative correlation is found, suggesting that the main four governance pillars are not 
substitutes. Overall, the correlations between the independent variables are relatively low, 
which suggests the absence of serious multicollinearity in the data. Nonetheless, we have 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIF), in order to rule out the negative potential effects 
of multicollinearity in the results. At a range of 1.14-1.18, VIF support our view that 
multicollinearity will not seriously affect the results.  
We now focus on the correlations between our performance metrics with the governance 
variables. QUICKSCORE and most of the four pillars are uncorrelated with performance 
variables, with the exception of SHRIGHTS which reflects a negative significant correlation 
with TOBINQ, ROA and ROE. This means that higher scores (weaker shareholder rights’ 
protection) should translate into lower firm performance. The AUDIT category also reflects 
a negative significant correlation with ROA, indicating that higher scores (weaker audit 
practices) would be consistent with lower performance as measured by ROA. On the other 
hand, not surprisingly, performance metrics are highly correlated among them. 
Regarding the control variables, QUICKSCORE only shows a significant positive 
relationship with GROWTH. All four governance pillars (except AUDIT) reflect a positive 
significant relationship with OWNCONC. This is consistent with the agency theory, as firms 
with concentrated ownership should display relatively higher scores (weaker governance 
quality).  
Insert Table 4 around here 
2.5. Empirical results 
In this section we present and discuss the results of the estimations of Equation (1). To make 
QUICKSCORE comparable across companies, consistent with the methodology used by 
ISS, we have standardized the variable at the sub-region level, rescaling the scores to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. As the Breusch-Pagan test suggests 
heteroscedasticity in our dataset,5 we conduct significance tests with robust standard errors.  
In Model 1, we study the primary relationship between QUICKSCORE and our three proxies 
of performance. To evaluate the separate impact of each of the four main governance pillars, 
                                                          
5 As a general rule, for the usual significant levels (0.01 or 0.05) we do not provide the specific mark. 
 
 




in Models 2-5 we replace QUICKSCORE by each of the partial ratings (BOARDST, 
COMPENS, SHRIGHTS and AUDIT). In Model 6, we allow for the simultaneity of all four 
partial pillars as independent variables to measure their combined impact on firm 
performance metrics. Tables 5 through 7 report the results of the regressions of the six 
models. 
2.5.1. Results of the main analysis 
Table 5 displays the results of the estimation of Equation (1) with TOBINQ as the proxy for 
performance. The main result is the existence of a positive significant relationship between 
QUICKSCORE and TOBINQ (p-value < 0.10), as reflected in Model 1. This contradicts our 
Hypothesis 1, as it indicates that firms with a higher QUICKSCORE (weaker governance) 
exhibit higher performance. As for the partial ratings (Models 2-5), we report significant 
results for BOARDST, with positive sign. This relationship remains significant when all 
partial ratings are simultaneously included in Model 6. As the results for Model 1, this also 
contradicts our expectations from Hypothesis 1.1, as it indicates that firms with higher 
BOARDST scores (weaker board structures) exhibit higher performance.   
As for control variables, we find a significantly inverse relationship between OWNCONC 
and performance in all models, except in Model 5 (p-value < 0.05 and < 0.10). This indicates 
that firms with higher ownership concentration (low minority shareholders power) exhibit 
lower performance as measured by TOBINQ. This is consistent with our prediction, based 
on the wealth expropriation hypothesis. Finally, we also observe the expected significant 
direct relationship with lagged performance (TOBINQ2013) in all six models.   
Insert Table 5 around here 
Table 6 depicts the results of the estimation of Equation (1) with ROA as the dependent 
variable. Model 1 shows a significant negative relationship (p-value < 0.10) between 
QUICKSCORE and ROA. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that firms with 
higher QUICKSCORE (weaker governance) exhibit lower performance. As for the partial 
ratings, we report non-significant results in all cases but SHRIGHTS, for which we observe 
the expected negative significant relationship (p-value < 0.10). However, this relationship 
turns non-significant in Model 6. In terms of the control variables, we only report significant 
results for the influence of current performance (ROA2013) with the predicted positive sign. 
Insert Table 6 around here 
 




Table 7 displays the results of the estimation of Equation (1) with ROE as the dependent 
variable. According to the results for Model 1, the relationship between QUICKSCORE and 
ROE is non-significant. In addition, no significant relationship is shown between any of the 
partial ratings and ROE, with the only exception of BOARDST in Model 2 (p-value < 0.10) 
with a positive sign. Hence, firms with higher BOARDST scores (weaker board practices) 
exhibit stronger performance as measured by ROE. This relationship remains significant 
when we introduce the partial ratings altogether in Model 6. These results are again 
inconsistent with our Hypotheses, reflecting a lack of impact of all governance ratings on 
performance, and particularly contradictory in the case of the BOARDST (Hypothesis 1.1). 
As for control variables, we confirm the significant direct influence of current year 
performance (ROE2013) on future performance. We also report a significant inverse 
relationship between OWNCONC and performance in all models (p-value < 0.05 and < 
0.10). Consistent with our prediction, this indicates that firms with higher ownership 
concentration (low minority shareholders power) exhibit weaker performance as measured 
by ROE.  
Insert Table 7 around here 
In overall, these results do not suggest that CGR constitute reliable predictors of firm 
performance. 
2.5.2. Additional results 
After the analysis conducted with the whole sample we perform additional analyses at the 
region level. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on Model 1 (with QUICKSCORE) and 
Model 6 (with all four partial ratings). Hence, we carry out separate estimations of Models 
1 and 6 for the AS and the CE regions. Results for the AS and CE regions are shown in 
Tables 8 and 9, respectively.  
In Table 8, the results for Model 1 show a significant relationship between QUICKSCORE 
and performance as measured by TOBINQ and ROE in the AS region. However, in both 
cases the sign of the relationship is contrary to our expectations. Thus, results for Model 1 
would not support Hypothesis 1. As for the estimation of Model 6, we find a positive 
significant coefficient for BOARDST when performance is proxied by TOBINQ and ROE, 
contradicting our Hypothesis 1.1. For AUDIT, we report a significant relationship with 
TOBINQ and ROE. The sign of this relationship follows our predictions from Hypothesis 
1.4 in the model with ROE, although not in the model with TOBINQ. 
 




Insert Table 8 around here 
Focusing on the CE region, results for Model 1 in Table 9, show a negative and significant 
relationship between QUICKSCORE and performance as measured by ROA. This is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, suggesting a negative influence of weaker governance 
practices (higher scores) on performance. However, when performance is measured by 
TOBINQ or ROE results are non-significant. As for the partial ratings covered in Model 6, 
we do not observe any significant results for any of the ratings in any of the estimations. 
This evidence also contradicts prior empirical research (Bauer et al., 2003), supporting that 
lower country governance standards (the CE in our case) tend to show stronger links 
between governance and performance. 
In terms of the influence of the control variables, the analysis confirms the strong positive 
impact of current performance on future performance in both regions. We also highlight the 
significant negative coefficient of OWNCONC for the AS region on firm performance as 
measured by ROE, consistent with our predictions for this variable.  
Insert Table 9 around here 
Finally, we conduct a robustness check to rule out the notion that conditions necessary for a 
significant governance-performance relationship are conditioned to achieve a level of 
governance quality beyond a certain threshold. Hence, we rerun our base regressions across 
various subsamples. Consistent with the portfolio approach proposed by Gompers, et al. 
(2003), we classify our sample of 237 firms into three clusters, according to QUICKSCORE: 
“good” quality (low risk) of governance (QUICKSCORE from 1 to 3), “medium” quality 
(medium risk) of governance (QUICKSCORE from 4 to 7), and “poor” quality (high risk) 
of governance (QUICKSCORE from 8 to 10). Almost half of the firms (46%) are at the 
“medium” governance practices level. Exactly a third of the firms are at the “good” 
governance practices level, while firms with “poor” governance represent the remaining 
21% of the sample. We then conduct sequential estimations of Equation (1) for the extreme 
“poor” and “good” quality of governance clusters. Results of this check are shown in Tables 
10 and 11.  
All the estimations fail to establish a significant relationship between QUICKSCORE and 
performance. Similarly, we do not observe any significant relationship between any of the 
partial ratings and performance. The only two exceptions occur in the model with ROE as 
the dependent variable, and in both cases the sign of the relationship is negative as predicted. 
Hence, in the estimation conducted with the sample of poorly governed firms, SHRIGHTS 
 




presents a significant coefficient, and the same occurs for AUDIT       (p-value < 0.10) in the 
estimation conducted with the sample of well-governed firms. As the small size of both 
subsamples might have affected the reported results, in a last robustness check (results not 
reported), we split the original sample into only two groups: “good” quality of governance 
(QUICKSCORE from 1 to 5), and “poor” quality of governance (QUICKSCORE from 6 to 
10), obtaining similar results.6 Overall, these robustness tests provide support to the results 
reported in the main analysis regarding a lack of a significant relationship between CGR and 
firm performance.  
Insert Tables 10 and 11 around here 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
This investigation addresses the association between commercial governance ratings and 
firm performance. Unlike most studies on this subject, which are focused on US companies, 
we investigate the European setting. Although our main interest is on the aggregate scores 
of the ratings (QUICKSCORE), we also study the relationship between partial scores relative 
to board structure, compensation, shareholder rights and audit practices, and performance. 
Moreover, in order to provide sounder results our study considers several metrics of 
performance. 
Overall, our results fail to support a consistent relationship between the tested ratings and 
firm performance for our Europe S&P350 sample. Although we report a few significant 
relationships for some of the ratings in some of the estimations, these results do not indicate 
that they are significantly associated with performance. In most cases, significance is only 
reported at marginal levels and the sign of the relationship is contrary to our predictions in 
around half of the cases. In addition, the governance quality-groups’ robustness checks have 
yielded steady results, increasing our confidence in the absence of a significant relationship 
between the tested ratings and performance. Therefore, we should conclude that neither 
aggregate QUICKSCORE nor partial ratings seem to be able to explain differences in 
performance across firms.  
In terms of the analysis at the region level, we find some unexpected results. For the CE 
region, only the relationship between QUICKSCORE and ROA was statistically validated, 
signaling the negative influence of weaker governance practices (higher ratings) on the 
                                                          
6 For the sake of simplicity, results for this set of robustness checks are not reported in tables. However, they are available 
upon request from the authors. 
 




company´s performance as measured by ROA. In the AS region, contrary to our 
expectations, the relationship between the overall quality of governance (QUICKSCORE) 
and performance (TOBINQ and ROE) was statistically validated, although the sign of this 
significant relationship stands surprisingly positive. This signals a direct influence of weaker 
governance practices (higher ratings) on performance. We also find sporadic and 
occasionally contradictory influences of certain governance pillars on performance.  
With regards to corporate ownership, the findings also show that higher ownership 
concentration negatively affects firm performance, suggesting that ownership concentration 
may be a performance-restraining mechanism, reflecting entrenchment of the management 
team, and confirming our expectations. We believe that this finding underpins the 
importance of controlling for this interdependence between performance and ownership 
concentration.  
In conclusion, similar to some recent papers in this field, our results call into question the 
usefulness of commercial governance ratings as they fail to establish a consistent relation 
between the QUICKSCORE and partial ratings and performance. Considering the increasing 
importance of these commercial ratings for companies and market participants, we believe 
that our empirical findings have a number of implications for corporate governance research 
and practice. First, our results question rating agencies’ vindication of these ratings, as they 
do not seem to create value for market participants. Advocates of commercial ratings should 
cautiously note the weak relationship between these ratings and the future performance of 
the firm. Consequently, if their purpose is to help investors pick up best performers, then 
such efforts might have been misguided. For that reason, we recommend that investors 
should make decisions based on commercial ratings only with due reservations. On the other 
hand, we might also recommend the providers of these ratings to improve their design of the 
ratings in order to release more accurate indexes.  
Second, our findings also have implications for corporate decision makers, as they 
increasingly feel pressured to change their corporate governance practices in reaction to 
rating agencies’ qualifications. In addition, policy makers also need to be cautious when 
using these ratings to analyze governance practices and make recommendations. Lastly, the 
inferences of our study extend beyond the merits of tested commercial ratings. We provide 
additional evidence regarding the troubles faced by rating agencies at devising reliable 
measures of the quality of corporate governance. On that regard, the approach of building 
aggregate indexes based on a wide array of factors might be ill-advised, as pointed out by 
 




Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009). Further investigation would be needed to determine which 
key factors are of real significance to enhance firm performance. Finally, as pointed out by 
Daines et al. (2010), the fact that results obtained using these more sophisticated commercial 
ratings remain controversial, also call into question conclusions reached by studies based on 
more simplistic academic corporate governance metrics.  
The limitations of the current study are represented by the short time period analyzed and 
the nature of our sample data, consisted of major companies in terms of market capitalization 
for the European corporate landscape (relatively homogenous in terms of size and age). 
Another important limitation is the relatively small samples used in some of the additional 
analyses. As a future avenue of research, we look to establish a panel data approach, by 
extending the time series to a minimum period of three years, allowing to build more robust 
relationships among critical variables. In addition, we might also expand our sample data 
beyond the very large (and usually older) corporations included in this dataset, as well as to 
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Table 1.  Description of variables 
Variable Code Definition 
Data 
Source 
Corporate Governance Variables      
Quickscore QUICKSCORE 2013 aggregate governance rating  ISS 
Board Structure BOARDST 2013 board structure pillar rating  ISS 
Compensation COMPENS 2013 compensation pillar rating  ISS 
Shareholder Rights SHRIGHTS 2013 shareholder rights pillar rating ISS 
Audit Practices AUDIT 2013 audit practices pillar rating  ISS 
Variables for Company Performance   
Adjusted  
Tobin´s Q (t+1) 
TOBINQ 
Quotient of the market value of assets 
(measured as the sum of the book value of total 
assets plus the market value of common equity 
minus the sum of book value of common equity 
and deferred taxes) divided by the replacement 
value of assets (book value of total assets) 
sector-adjusted for the year 2014. 
S&P   
Capital IQ 
Adjusted Return on 
Assets (t+1) 
ROA 
Division of the company´s operating income 
divided by total assets at book value sector-
adjusted for the year 2014 
S&P   
Capital IQ 
Adjusted Return on 
Equity (t+1) 
ROE 
Division of the company´s income before 
extraordinary items available for common equity 
divided by the book value of common equity 
sector-adjusted for the year 2014 
S&P   
Capital IQ 
Control Variables    
Firm Size (t+1) SIZE 
Measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets in 2014 
S&P  
Capital IQ 
Firm Age (t+1) AGE 
Defined as the number of years passed since the 











Level of  
Leverage (t+1) 
LEVER 
[Long Term Debt / Market Value of Equity plus 






Log [S5/100 - S5)], where S5 represents the 




Adjusted Tobin´s Q TOBINQ2013 Sector-adjusted Tobin´s Q in 2013 
S&P  
Capital IQ 
Adjusted ROA ROA2013 Sector-adjusted ROA in 2013 
S&P  
Capital IQ 
Adjusted ROE ROE2013 Sector-adjusted ROE in 2013 
S&P  
Capital IQ 









Table 2.  Dataset breakdown by main regions and sectors 
 
Region Sub-region Country Frequency Percent 
  UK 63  
  Ireland 5  
Anglo-Saxon (AS)     68         28.69  
 
Germanic 
Austria 3  
 Germany 29  
 Switzerland 17  
 
Nordic 
Finland 8  
 Denmark 4  
 Sweden 17  
 Norway 5  
 
Southern 
Spain 13  
 Italy 9  
 Greece 1  
 
Western 
France 37  
 Luxembourg 4  
 Netherlands 15  
 Belgium 7   
Continental Europe (CE)     169         71.31  




   
Sectors Frequency Percent 
Communications 24 10.13 
Consumer Discretionary 44 18.57 
Consumer Staples 32 13.50 
Energy 14 5.91 
Health Care 16 6.75 
Industrials 44 18.57 
Materials 31 13.08 
Technology 14 5.91 
Utilities 18 7.59 










Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for the whole sample      
 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Corporate Governance Variables       
QUICKSCORE 237 5.04 5 2.70 1 10 
BOARDST 237 4.70 5 3.12 1 10 
COMPENS 237 4.95 5 2.67 1 10 
SHRIGHTS 237 4.47 3 2.81 1 10 
AUDIT 237 1.34 1 1.72 1 10 
Company Performance Variables       
TOBINQ 237 0.15 0 0.59 -0.58 1.38 
ROA 237 0.66 0 3.58 -4.34 6.85 
ROE 237 1.28 0 9.38 -11.40 20.20 
Control Variables            
SIZE 237 9.70 9.56 1.19 7.26 12.80 
AGE 237 4.28 4.51 0.82 1.61 6.48 
GROWTH 237 3.99 3.85 7.89 -33.10 34.80 
LEVER 237 24.80 23.90 14.00 0 61.20 
OWNCONC 237 34.30 29.80 16.60 2.53 89.70 
TOBINQ2013 237 1.98 1.55 1.38 0.38 9.73 
ROA2013 237 9.21 8.13 6.15 -2.44 44.8 
ROE2013 237 7.64 12.40 65.30 -744 178 
 
 




Table 3.1.  Descriptive statistics for the Anglo-Saxon (AS) region 
           
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Corporate Governance Variables       
QUICKSCORE 68 4.16 4 2.05 1 9 
BOARDST 68 3.51 1 3.26 1 10 
COMPENS 68 4.26 4 2.25 1 10 
SHRIGHTS 68 3.12 3 1.09 1 9 
AUDIT 68 1.26 1 1.53 1 10 
Company Performance Variables       
TOBINQ 68 0.41 0.28 0.62 -0.58 1.38 
ROA 68 1.77 1.19 3.84 -4.34 6.85 
ROE 68 4.80 2.73 11.1 -11.4 20.20 
Control Variables             
SIZE 68 9.37 9.16 1.19 7.27 12.40 
AGE 68 4.16 4.42 0.91 1.61 5.61 
GROWTH 68 5.91 5.14 7.55 -8.23 34.40 
LEVER 68 27.20 27.30 13.90 0 61.20 
OWNCONC 68 28.10 26.20 11.50 7.15 73.10 
TOBINQ2013 68 2.30 1.89 1.45 0.98 9.59 
ROA2013 68 11.40 10.90 6.27 -0.16 34.90 
ROE2013 68 2.94 16.40 112 -744 178 
  
 




Table 3.2.  Descriptive statistics for the continental Europe (CE) region    
 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Corporate Governance Variables       
QUICKSCORE 169 5.39 5 2.85 1 10 
BOARDST 169 5.18 5 2.94 1 10 
COMPENS 169 5.23 5 2.79 1 10 
SHRIGHTS 169 5.01 4 3.10 1 10 
AUDIT 169 1.37 1 1.80 1 10 
Company Performance Variables       
TOBINQ 169 -0.03 -0.27 0.64 -0.76 1.18 
ROA 169 -0.03 -0.59 1.67 -2.08 2.62 
ROE 169 -0.21 -0.78 2.49 -3.38 4.50 
Control Variables             
SIZE 169 9.81 9.76 1.02 8.22 11.40 
AGE 169 4.30 4.50 0.70 2.94 5.08 
GROWTH 169 1.80 2.21 4.74 -6.25 9.00 
LEVER 169 23.70 22.90 11.70 7.25 44.30 
OWNCONC 169 35.90 33.40 14.40 17.70 59.40 
TQ2013 169 -0.02 -0.31 0.66 -0.76 1.16 
ROA2013 169 -0.11 -0.60 1.75 -2.16 2.74 
ROE2013 169 -0.22 -0.65 2.46 -3.52 3.68 
 
 




Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients 
  QUICKSCORE BOARDST COMPENS SHRIGHTS AUDIT TOBINQ ROA ROE SIZE AGE GROWTH LEVER OWNCONC ROA2013 ROE2013 
BOARDST 0.67* 1.00                
  0.00                 
COMPENS 0.49* 0.29* 1.00               
  0.00 0.00                
SHRIGHTS 0.54* 0.17* -0.08 1.00              
  0.00 0.01 0.24               
AUDIT 0.22* -0.02 -0.02 0.11 1.00             
  0.00 0.80 0.74 0.10               
TOBINQ -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.20* -0.11 1.00           
  0.14 0.71 0.59 0.00 0.10             
ROA -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.20* -0.15* 0.75* 1.00          
  0.38 0.77 0.49 0.00 0.03 0.00           
ROE -0.08 0.01 -0.08 -0.13* -0.11 0.63* 0.56* 1.00         
  0.25 0.89 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00            
SIZE 0.09 0.11 -0.08 0.19* 0.05 -0.43* -0.33* -0.21* 1.00            
  0.19 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00         
AGE -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 1.00       
  0.10 0.56 0.12 0.63 0.43 0.82 0.60 0.66 0.84        
GROWTH 0.18* 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.14* 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 1.00      
  0.01 0.05 0.14 0.95 0.34 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.80 0.08       
LEVER -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 0.04 0.18* -0.08 -0.05 1.00     
  0.55 0.33 0.85 0.60 0.99 0.07 0.15 0.54 0.01 0.24 0.42      
OWNCONC 0.34* 0.36* 0.24* 0.14* 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.16* 0.02 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 1.00    
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.88 0.14 0.44 0.04 0.71 0.31 0.42 0.70       
ROA2013 0.02 0.11 0.04 -0.14* -0.16* 0.69* 0.81* 0.54* -0.30* 0.03 0.19* -0.11 -0.03 1.00  
  0.79 0.10 0.53 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.10 0.62   
ROE2013 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.23* 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.18* 0.04 0.05 1.00 
  0.39 0.07 0.63 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.61 0.00 0.99 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.58 0.44  
TOBINQ2013 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.64* 0.42* 0.42* -0.44* 0.04 0.12 -0.26* -0.02 0.57* 0.06 
  0.80 0.68 0.72 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.06 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.36 
* p<0.05                
 
 




Table 5.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q 
 
VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
       
QUICKSCORE 0.040*      
 (1.671)      
BOARDST  0.048**    0.063** 
  (2.087)    (2.305) 
COMPENS   0.004   0.003 
   (0.168)   (0.092) 
SHRIGHTS    0.017  0.008 
    (0.739)  (0.316) 
AUDIT     0.010 0.012 
     (0.540) (0.671) 
SIZE -0.021 -0.027 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.029 
 (-0.975) (-1.215) (-0.906) (-1.004) (-0.839) (-1.153) 
AGE -0.013 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.009 -0.004 
 (-0.460) (-0.547) (-0.600) (-0.622) (-0.274) (-0.137) 
GROWTH 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000 
 (0.235) (0.247) (0.564) (0.579) (0.398) (0.048) 
LEVER -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.144) (-0.193) (-0.208) (-0.157) (0.160) (0.188) 
OWNCONC -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 -0.005** 
 (-2.163) (-2.018) (-1.700) (-1.793) (-1.549) (-2.134) 
TOBINQ2013 0.831*** 0.823*** 0.824*** 0.825*** 0.820*** 0.827*** 
 (20.958) (21.063) (20.922) (20.193) (17.056) (17.859) 
Constant 0.399 0.475* 0.386 0.406* 0.345 0.461* 
 (1.633) (1.891) (1.552) (1.653) (1.290) (1.685)        
Adjusted R2 0.748 0.750 0.745 0.746 0.722 0.726 
F-Statistic 144.4*** 143.9*** 131.9*** 122.7*** 93.9*** 87.3*** 
Companies (N) 237 237 237 237 203 203 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.    








Table 6.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by ROA 
       
VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
       
QUICKSCORE -0.083*      
 (-1.753)      
BOARDST  -0.055    -0.058 
  (-1.069)    (-0.915) 
COMPENS   -0.003   0.005 
   (-0.061)   (0.085) 
SHRIGHTS    -0.083*  -0.075 
    (-1.798)  (-1.480) 
AUDIT         -0.028 -0.021 
     (-1.237) (-0.883) 
SIZE -0.064 -0.060 -0.069 -0.060 -0.068 -0.051 
 (-1.380) (-1.273) (-1.487) (-1.298) (-1.297) (-0.907) 
AGE -0.095 -0.087 -0.085 -0.085 -0.077 -0.085 
 (-1.420) (-1.324) (-1.340) (-1.294) (-1.023) (-1.141) 
GROWTH 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 
 (0.649) (0.542) (0.420) (0.440) (0.809) (0.773) 
LEVER -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-1.614) (-1.549) (-1.524) (-1.637) (-1.405) (-1.460) 
OWNCONC 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.027) (-0.106) (-0.439) (-0.270) (-0.902) (-0.284) 
ROA2013 0.862*** 0.864*** 0.862*** 0.860*** 0.846*** 0.848*** 
 (39.530) (39.729) (38.366) (38.447) (30.926) (31.198) 
Constant 1.201** 1.148* 1.261** 1.169** 1.246* 1.049 
 (2.121) (1.964) (2.275) (2.119) (1.936) (1.621)        
Adjusted R2 0.839 0.837 0.837 0.839 0.812 0.812 
F-Statistic 350.9*** 340.4*** 336.9*** 356.6*** 230.7*** 170.8*** 
Companies (N) 237 237 237 237 203 203 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.      










Table 7.   Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by ROE 
       
VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
       
QUICKSCORE 0.084      
 (0.555)      
BOARDST  0.290*    0.331* 
  (1.927)    (1.850) 
COMPENS   -0.092   -0.145 
   (-0.668)   (-0.897) 
SHRIGHTS    0.014  -0.015 
    (0.070)  (-0.069) 
AUDIT         -0.050 -0.046 
     (-0.295) (-0.263) 
SIZE -0.144 -0.175 -0.150 -0.142 -0.058 -0.122 
 (-1.008) (-1.206) (-1.058) (-1.005) (-0.395) (-0.800) 
AGE 0.101 0.104 0.079 0.092 0.005 0.000 
 (0.499) (0.517) (0.386) (0.453) (0.022) (0.001) 
GROWTH -0.008 -0.015 -0.001 -0.004 -0.027 -0.033 
 (-0.234) (-0.469) (-0.035) (-0.131) (-0.766) (-0.902) 
LEVER 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (1.407) (1.376) (1.399) (1.416) (1.240) (1.289) 
OWNCONC -0.020** -0.024** -0.017* -0.018* -0.017* -0.023** 
 (-2.116) (-2.450) (-1.883) (-1.942) (-1.705) (-2.029) 
ROE2013 0.698*** 0.695*** 0.694*** 0.696*** 0.715*** 0.716*** 
 (11.507) (11.651) (11.526) (11.511) (11.239) (11.589) 
Constant 1.348 1.813 1.405 1.318 0.840 1.679 
 (0.878) (1.166) (0.914) (0.848) (0.509) (0.958)        
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.457 0.448 0.447 0.441 0.445 
F-Statistic 33.8*** 37.0*** 32.1*** 33.4*** 27.1*** 22.4*** 
Companies (N) 237 237 237 237 203 203 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
  
 




Table 8.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance for 
the Anglo-Saxon (AS) region 
 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ ROA ROA ROE ROE 
VARIABLES Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 
              
QUICKSCORE 0.117***   0.021   0.707**  
 (2.991)   (0.196)   (2.003)  
BOARDST   0.104**   -0.076   0.934*** 
   (2.555)   (-0.715)   (3.436) 
COMPENS   0.027   0.196   -0.151 
   (0.585)   (1.306)   (-0.459) 
SHRIGHTS   0.039   -0.010   0.284 
   (0.885)   (-0.083)   (0.709) 
AUDIT   0.039**   0.023   -0.604*** 
    (2.540)   (0.508)   (-4.022) 
SIZE -0.032 -0.037 -0.033 -0.036 -0.473 -0.441 
 (-0.728) (-0.800) (-0.320) (-0.311) (-1.392) (-1.297) 
AGE -0.002 -0.012 -0.106 -0.075 0.001 0.110 
 (-0.047) (-0.268) (-0.658) (-0.475) (0.002) (0.270) 
GROWTH -0.001 0.003 0.039 0.029 -0.138* -0.100 
 (-0.101) (0.278) (1.169) (0.727) (-1.797) (-1.210) 
LEVER  0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 0.012 0.011 
 (0.771) (1.096) (-1.140) (-1.027) (0.504) (0.482) 
OWNCONC -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.078** -0.095** 
 (-1.021) (-0.899) (-1.138) (-1.314) (-2.065) (-2.216) 
TOBINQ/ROA/ROE  0.881*** 0.880*** 0.870*** 0.862*** 0.596*** 0.593*** 
2013 (19.324) (19.043) (16.212) (15.600) (4.586) (4.931) 
Constant 0.446 0.511 1.194 1.226 7.197* 6.884* 
 (0.782) (0.840) (0.764) (0.722) (1.763) (1.731) 
            
Adjusted R2 0.792 0.790 0.737 0.735 0.303 0.368 
F-Statistic 90.9*** 84.8*** 82.1*** 62.5*** 6.9*** 8.1*** 
Companies (N) 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.       








Table 9.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance for 
the continental Europe (CE) region 
 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ ROA ROA ROE ROE 
VARIABLES Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 
              
QUICKSCORE -0.003   -0.109**   -0.166  
 (-0.094)   (-1.985)   (-1.108)  
BOARDST   0.019   -0.012   -0.119 
   (0.468)   (-0.138)   (-0.563) 
COMPENS   -0.000   -0.091   -0.031 
   (-0.009)   (-1.337)   (-0.181) 
SHRIGHTS   -0.013   -0.081   -0.260 
   (-0.327)   (-1.286)   (-1.373) 
AUDIT   0.000   -0.020   0.223 
    (0.004)   (-0.582)   (1.269) 
SIZE -0.013 -0.010 -0.075 -0.087 -0.104 0.183 
 (-0.453) (-0.229) (-1.514) (-1.136) (-0.610) (1.021) 
AGE -0.028 -0.014 -0.073 -0.077 0.180 0.043 
 (-0.732) (-0.279) (-1.283) (-1.090) (0.767) (0.151) 
GROWTH 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 0.034 -0.008 
 (0.543) (0.231) (-0.464) (-0.137) (0.886) (-0.175) 
LEVER  -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.009 0.002 
 (-1.135) (-0.684) (-0.932) (-0.484) (0.628) (0.140) 
OWNCONC -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 
 (-1.259) (-1.134) (0.226) (-0.165) (-0.641) (-0.127) 
TOBINQ/ROA/ROE  0.783*** 0.768*** 0.879*** 0.858*** 0.712*** 0.782*** 
2013 (13.662) (10.135) (47.095) (33.670) (10.056) (10.082) 
Constant 0.380 0.298 1.182** 1.298 0.144 -2.157 
 (1.292) (0.751) (2.136) (1.620) (0.088) (-1.216) 
            
Adjusted R2 0.705 0.640 0.876 0.836 0.520 0.532 
F-Statistic 61.2*** 27.7*** 548.7*** 278.6*** 41.1*** 26.1*** 
Companies (N) 169 135 169 135 169 135 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.       








Table 10.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance for 
the poor-quality governance group 
 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ ROA ROA ROE ROE 
VARIABLES Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 
              
QUICKSCORE 0.074   -0.311   0.172  
 (0.359)   (-1.184)   (0.205)  
BOARDST   0.056   -0.019   0.581 
   (0.731)   (-0.131)   (1.397) 
COMPENS   -0.008   -0.105   -0.367 
   (-0.161)   (-0.762)   (-1.064) 
SHRIGHTS   -0.023   0.027   -0.515** 
   (-0.481)   (0.406)   (-2.149) 
AUDIT   -0.003   -0.054   0.252 
    (-0.070)   (-0.807)   (0.844) 
SIZE -0.065 -0.101 -0.156 -0.230 -0.467 -0.533 
 (-1.053) (-1.177) (-1.309) (-1.332) (-1.319) (-1.293) 
AGE 0.062 0.033 0.047 0.103 0.580 0.284 
 (0.849) (0.244) (0.354) (0.467) (1.003) (0.475) 
GROWTH 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.096* -0.005 
 (1.201) (1.061) (0.346) (0.606) (1.694) (-0.065) 
LEVER  0.005 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.017 0.055 
 (0.910) (1.136) (-0.712) (-0.183) (0.527) (1.626) 
OWNCONC -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.011 0.012 
 (-1.035) (-0.600) (-0.103) (-0.170) (-0.455) (0.552) 
TOBINQ/ROA/ROE  0.773*** 0.655*** 0.860*** 0.830*** 0.493*** 0.409** 
2013 (6.997) (4.352) (17.422) (15.107) (3.419) (2.265) 
Constant 0.373 0.779 1.898 1.939 1.434 1.793 
 (0.493) (0.957) (1.161) (1.141) (0.411) (0.431) 
            
Adjusted R2 0.697 0.524 0.844 0.772 0.322 0.176 
F-Statistic 43.1*** 13.3*** 171.3*** 62.3*** 6.9*** 4.4*** 
Companies (N) 50 41 50 41 50 41 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.      








Table 11.  Results on the influence of ISS Quickscore governance ratings on performance for 
the good-quality governance group 
 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ ROA ROA ROE ROE 
 Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 Model1 Model6 
              
QUICKSCORE 0.053   0.104   -1.315  
 (0.397)   (0.333)   (-1.610)  
BOARDST   -0.117   -0.082   -0.127 
   (-1.363)   (-0.610)   (-0.287) 
COMPENS   0.117   0.350   -0.150 
   (1.064)   (1.359)   (-0.411) 
SHRIGHTS   0.066   -0.109   -0.230 
   (0.827)   (-0.614)   (-0.459) 
AUDIT   0.734   -2.117   -9.277* 
    (0.674)   (-0.818)   (-1.831) 
SIZE 0.013 0.051 -0.043 -0.009 -0.204 -0.062 
 (0.345) (0.965) (-0.622) (-0.122) (-0.835) (-0.276) 
AGE -0.019 -0.041 -0.190 -0.152 0.475 0.574 
 (-0.510) (-0.780) (-1.169) (-0.973) (1.453) (1.626) 
GROWTH -0.009 -0.019 -0.014 -0.030 -0.084* -0.128** 
 (-0.823) (-1.272) (-0.563) (-1.049) (-1.702) (-2.267) 
LEVER  -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 0.022 0.005 
 (-0.667) (-0.542) (-1.134) (-0.727) (0.949) (0.262) 
OWNCONC 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.478) (1.056) (0.417) (0.486) (-0.607) (-0.247) 
TOBINQ/ROA/ROE  0.889*** 0.934*** 0.834*** 0.839*** 0.794*** 0.912*** 
2013 (18.307) (18.933) (17.223) (14.089) (8.141) (13.296) 
Constant -0.007 -0.282 1.632 0.672 -1.692 -4.119 
 (-0.020) (-0.565) (1.213) (0.536) (-0.577) (-1.434) 
            
Adjusted R2 0.745 0.755 0.776 0.765 0.545 0.605 
F-Statistic 72.3*** 48.9*** 93.4*** 62.5*** 34.2*** 27.3*** 
Companies (N) 79 68 79 68 79 68 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.      










Chapter 3. Evaluating the impact of compliance with governance recommendations 
on firm performance: the case of Spain 
3.1. Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically examine whether higher levels of compliance with the 
recommendations included in the Spanish Unified Good Governance Code (UGGC) have 
an impact on firm performance using a unique hand-collected panel data set of 145 listed 
companies for the research period between 2007 and 2012. We find that, in spite of the 
increasing compliance trend, there is no conclusive evidence that adherence to the UGGC 
guidelines is a performance relevant factor. This result seems to be robust, as it holds in the 
main analysis as well as in all the additional analyses conducted. Therefore, our findings 
would further support the lack of consensus in this line of research regarding the true impact 
of compliance with the globally disseminated codes of best corporate governance practices 
on firm performance.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance; compliance with governance codes; firm performance. 
  
 





Following the publication of the influential 1992 Cadbury Committee’s Code of Best 
Governance Practices in the UK, many countries have followed suit. The shocking corporate 
governance failures at the beginning of this century reinforced the need for effective 
mechanisms that will protect investors over the potential autocratic power exerted by 
managers of public companies. These government actions have taken place either through a 
“hard approach” by the enactment of regulations, as in the case of the US with the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or a “soft approach” related to a voluntary implementation of a series 
of corporate governance guidelines. This latter approach has been favored by most countries 
in adjusting to modern governance standards, as it provides firms with a higher degree of 
flexibility (Seidl et al., 2013).  
According to information from the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI),7 
currently more than 110 countries and international organizations have issued one or several 
codes of governance. These codes have symbolized a legitimization process while 
attempting to synthesize best business practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
Through adherence to this soft legislation, governments have sought to level the ground for 
governance practices as a way to overcome the weaknesses of the legal and institutional 
environment, as argued by López and Pereira (2006) in their study of governance codes 
across 29 countries. This global governance reform movement is pursuing to restore 
confidence and make companies more attractive for investors, particularly in those nations 
where investors have weaker legal protection (Klapper and Love, 2004).  
The first Spanish code of corporate governance (known as the Olivencia Code) was issued 
in 1998, inspired by the Cadbury code’s pioneering “comply or explain” approach. It was 
followed by the Aldama Code in 2002 (Aldama, 2002) and the 2006 Unified Good 
Governance Code (UGGC), also known as the Conthe Code (CNMV, 2013). The UGGC 
has 58 main recommendations and initial company reports started in 2007. The 
recommendations are grouped into five areas. The area 1 recommendations belong to 
Statutes and General Meeting (guidelines 1-6). The area 2 is associated to the Board of 
Directors (guidelines 7-26). The area 3 refers to recommendations on the Directors 
(guidelines 27-34).  The area 4 (guidelines 35-41) relates to Remuneration practices, and 
lastly the area 5 gathers information related to the Committees (guidelines 42-58).  
                                                          
7 See ECGI, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (last visited September 30, 2017). 
 




These codes are a set of critical governance guidelines or recommendations that should be 
followed by all Spanish listed companies regardless of their size and market capitalization 
(Fernández-Fernández, 1999). While compliance is not mandatory, in contrast to the US 
“rules-based” approach, listed Spanish companies must disclose in their annual governance 
reports the degree of adherence to these recommendations, or explain the reasons for 
noncompliance. Overall, repeated changes and updates in the UGGC (June 2013 and 
February 2015), have contributed to align Spanish companies’ governance practices with 
OECD and European standards (García-Castro et al., 2012; Gutierrez and Surroca, 2014). 
This article studies the effects on firm performance from compliance to such a set of non-
binding governance standards. We build upon the investigation carried out by Rose (2016) 
for Danish firms and evaluate whether the results are maintained in the Spanish context. We 
hypothesize that an effective implementation of the UGGC enhances firm performance. To 
test this hypothesis, we use return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as proxies 
of performance, following Rose’s (2016) study for Denmark.  Additionally, we use Tobin´s 
Q as an alternative measure of performance, which is customary for empirical corporate 
governance research.8 Moreover, as Rose (2016), we do not only focus on the overall 
compliance with the governance code, but also study the relationship between compliance 
with recommendations in each governance area and performance.  
The motivation of this study is justified by the practical importance of the subject: to 
improve corporate governance structures and practices. The growing use of different 
governance measures as proxies for quality of governance and the extended belief that such 
advantage will prove effective in enhancing firm performance has emerged as a meaningful 
line of research. So far, the study of this relationship has generated considerable interest 
through two predominant lines of research relying either on the use of academic governance 
indexes (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009) or on commercial governance indexes 
(Brown and Caylor, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2007; Renders et al., 2010; Núñez and Garcia-
Blandon, 2017). Overall, these studies have yielded non-conclusive results about a 
systematic relation between the indexes and performance. Conversely, there is rather limited 
empirical literature on this topic’s third line of research that examines the impact on firm 
performance from compliance with a complete set of official governance guidelines (Padgett 
and Shabbir, 2005). As pointed out by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pg. 377), “the 
                                                          
8 Within this paper, we refer to TOBINQ, ROA and ROE as firm-level performance indicators. 
 




current state of knowledge appears to be at an impasse as there is some conflicting evidence 
on the effectiveness of codes of good governance”. This paper is intended to help fill this 
gap by shedding light on the very usefulness of codes of good governance to enable 
companies to improve their governance and performance.  
This investigation intends to contribute to this area of research by analyzing the impact on 
performance from compliance with the Spanish governance code, following Rose’s (2016) 
approach. As pointed out by Rose (2016), further country studies are needed to validate 
conclusions about this important issue. Hence, our study constitutes a natural extension of 
his research. There are strong reasons that suggest that results of country studies should not 
be generalized as they will likely depend on the country-specific legal regime (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1998). Furthermore, the level of trustworthiness embedded 
in the self-evaluations provided by the companies regarding the level of compliance with 
recommendations might also be country dependent. Hence, country-specific issues such as 
culture and business ethics, as well as the level of disclosure and outsiders’ difficulty to 
verify the information, could constitute a distinguishing factor and help to explain 
differences across countries. In this regard, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) rank 
Spain at the bottom of European countries in terms of its legal efficiency index. Overall, we 
believe that the Spanish market provides an interesting setting in which to conduct such a 
study.  
It should also be noticed that, unlike Rose (2016) who conducts a cross-sectional estimation 
of the model for year 2013, we employ a unique hand-collected panel data set of 145 Spanish 
listed companies for the period between 2007 and 2012. The use of dynamic panel data 
model reduces the sources of endogeneity that can lead to purely spurious results (Schultz 
et al., 2010), as our sample includes the same firms in different situations of compliance and 
performance across the years. Supporting this view, in all models the coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable are positive and significant, indicating that dynamics play a 
relevant role in this relationship. 
The results of this study might have some practical implications, as they provide some 
indications of the ability of compliance with a governance code to predict performance for 
Spanish firms. From a more general point of view, it also contributes to the debate about the 
very usefulness of these governance codes. 
In anticipation of our results, we do not observe a significant relationship between 
compliance with the UGGC and firm performance. This result seems robust as it holds in 
 




the main analysis as well as in all the additional checks. Even for those companies with the 
highest level of compliance with the UGGC, we observe the same pattern of mixed results. 
Therefore, our findings cast some doubts about the real effectiveness of compliance with the 
codes of good governance as a suitable tool to boost performance. The comparison of our 
findings for Spain with Rose’s (2016) for Denmark highlights the importance of the national 
context in corporate governance issues and, therefore, the difficulties of generalizing results.  
We structure the work as follows. First, we analyze previous literature on the relationship 
between compliance with governance codes and performance. Then, the paper continues 
with the description of hypotheses and develops the methodological proposal. Finally, we 
comment on the results of the empirical analysis and conclude with the main remarks and 
implications derived from these results. 
3.3. Background and hypothesis development 
Based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the relation between quality of 
governance and firm performance is quite straightforward. Well-governed firms exhibit 
higher investors’ confidence reflecting enhanced management’s monitoring and 
disciplining. As a result, these firms should exhibit lower risk and enjoy a reduced cost of 
capital, which should translate into higher valuation and performance.  
We find a limited number of studies evaluating whether compliance with governance codes 
has an effect on firm performance. In addition, it should be noted that these prior studies at 
the international level offer heterogeneous results. In one of the first studies on this subject, 
Weir and Laing (2000) investigated the relationship between compliance with UK Cadbury 
governance recommendations and performance for a sample of local listed companies in 
1992 and 1995, finding no conclusive evidence of a significant relationship at the aggregate 
level. Conversely, in a later study for a sample of FTSE 350 companies between 2000 and 
2003, Padgett and Shabbir (2005) showed a clear positive relationship between the level of 
compliance with the UK “Combined Code” and performance.  
For continental European firms, the available empirical evidence is also mixed. In a multiple 
jurisdiction investigation using a large sample of European companies in 2000 and 2001, 
Bauer et al. (2004) reported the surprising result that firm performance (ROE and Net Profit 
Margin) is negatively related with accomplishment of governance standards. Moreover, in 
a study of German companies listed at the Frankfurt Stock Market, Stiglbauer and Velte 
(2014) found that compliance with the local governance code is not a value driver. 
 




Conversely, Goncharov et al., (2006), on another country study for Germany, found a 
positive significant relationship between their measure of compliance with a local 
governance code and stock market performance for large companies listed in DAX30 and 
MDAX.  
In another single jurisdiction study, Alves and Mendez (2004), using a sample of Portuguese 
listed firms, reported a positive stock market performance effect connected to compliance 
with some of the corporate governance recommendations issued by the Portuguese 
Securities Market Commission (mainly with recommendations about structure and 
functioning of the board of directors). However, De Jong et al. (2005) found no relation 
between implementation of the governance guidelines embedded in the Peter Committee’s 
self-regulations initiative and firm value for a sample of Dutch firms.  
Lastly, regarding country studies in Europe, Rose (2016), in one of the few investigations 
on this subject identified in scientific journals for the last years (Michelberger, 2016), 
documented a positive statistically significant relationship between the level of compliance 
with local governance code and firm performance (ROA/ROE) for a sample of large Danish 
firms in 2010. However, this result was not too robust as significance for the model with 
ROE was only reported at marginal levels (p-value < 0.1). Moreover, the partial analyses 
conducted by Rose for each area of compliance showed mixed results: while a positive 
relationship between compliance and performance is reported for recommendations on 
board composition and remuneration policies, there is no impact on performance from 
increasing compliance with risk management and internal controls’ guidelines. 
In the developing world, Benavides-Franco and Mongrut-Montalván (2010) investigated 
this relationship in Colombia for a period of five years after the local governance code was 
first introduced in 2001. Results confirmed a positive relationship between compliance with 
governance guidelines and performance. Tariq and Abbas (2013) evaluated the efficacy of 
Pakistan’s governance code using eight years of panel data and found a positive link between 
compliance with the code and performance.  
As far as empirical research conducted within Spain, which is the focus of this paper, Del 
Brio et al. (2006), using a limited sample of local firms in 1999-2001, reported a positive 
relationship between some corporate governance related variables (i.e., the quality of audit 
reports and the magnitude of director remuneration) and the value of the firm. There are also 
some interesting investigations exploring the impact of reported governance compliance and 
market reaction. Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2004), using event study methodology for a 
 




limited sample of firms in 1998-2000, reported that compliance with the Olivencia Code in 
case of major restructuring of the board of directors caused a positive market reaction. No 
effect was reported in relation to announcements related to isolated recommendations. In a 
related study looking at the reaction of investors to the publication of corporate governance 
reports, Martinez-Blasco et al. (2017) reported a lack of significant market reaction to the 
release of corporate governance reports. 
As discussed in the review of the literature, compliance with corporate governance codes is 
becoming an important tool for measuring the quality of governance. Since compliance with 
such codes involves significant implementation costs, companies and investors expect that 
such efforts will translate into better economic results (Aguilera et al., 2008). We address 
the significance of compliance with the Spanish UGGC by answering the question of 
whether differences in these compliance ratios can help to explain variations in performance 
that have not been captured by other relevant characteristics of the firm. Although the 
available evidence is rather mixed, we expect a positive relationship between compliance 
with the UGGC and performance. Therefore, the first hypothesis states: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Compliance with the UGGC (CompUGGC), is positively and 
significantly associated with performance. 
 
Given that our UGGC is an aggregate set of rules based on five main corporate governance 
areas, the fact that Hypothesis 1 holds for the overall UGGC does not necessarily mean that 
it will hold true for each of these five areas and vice versa. We agree with the criteria for 
grouping all the code governance recommendations into these five main groups, as they 
represent the most critical areas in relation to successful corporate governance. Next, we 
develop specific hypotheses for each area within the UGGC.  
The role of bylaws and the powers of shareholders’ meeting for the future of the company 
is central to corporate governance. We rely on the compliance with this set of 
recommendations gathered in area 1 of the UGGC (CompUGGC1) as a broad representation 
of the quality of bylaws and shareholders’ meeting, and as such, we study its impact on 
performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
 




Hypothesis 1.1. Compliance with area 1 of UGGC, referred to as bylaws and 
shareholders meeting’ recommendations (CompUGGC1), is positively 
and significantly associated with performance. 
In light of the prominent role and important transformations experienced by the board of 
directors within past decades, numerous studies have focused on the relation between 
several attributes of the board (competences, size, composition, practices) and firm 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). As areas 2 and 3 of the UGGC 
include the most relevant recommendations for board structure and directors covered in prior 
research, we believe that they should reveal the expected relationship between these 
governance areas and performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.2. Compliance with area 2 of UGGC, referred to as board structure 
recommendations (CompUGGC2), is positively and significantly 
associated with performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1.3. Compliance with area 3 of UGGC, referred to as director 
recommendations (CompUGGC3), is positively and significantly 
associated with performance. 
 
An important insight shared by most researchers is that board decisions appear to be largely 
influenced by remuneration. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mehran (1995), among others, 
have provided evidence supporting a strong impact of remuneration practices on 
performance. Compliance with this area should constitute a valid proxy to examine the 
relationship between this important area of governance and performance. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.4. Compliance with area 4 of UGGC, referred to as remuneration 
practices (CompUGGC4), is positively and significantly associated 
with performance. 
 
Regarding the last category, prior studies have documented an increasing importance of 
board of directors’ committees on performance, even though no conclusive evidence has 
been found. We highlight the works of Brown and Caylor (2009) and Bowen et al. (2008) 
 




on this subject. As this area of the UGGC code covers the most important attributes of board 
committees stressed in the literature, we use it as a proxy to analyze the relationship between 
this governance area and performance. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1.5. Compliance with area 5 of UGGC, referred to as committee practices 
(CompUGGC5), is positively and significantly associated with 
performance. 
3.3. Research design 
In our analysis, we have followed Rose’s (2016) approach, investigating the relevance of 
compliance with corporate governance recommendations in explaining firm performance. 
To provide a basis for comparison, we first estimate cross-sectional regressions for each of 
the six years in our dataset given by Equation (1).  
 
ROA/ROE i = α + β(CompUGGC) i + γ Z i + ε i    (1) 
 
Our main independent variable is the firm-level degree of compliance with UGGC 
(CompUGGC). We also test the five partial compliance areas (CompUGGC1, 
CompUGGC2, CompUGGC3, CompUGGC4, CompUGGC5) as independent variables. To 
test the robustness of this relationship we add the control variables (Zi) used by Rose (2016), 
while εi is the error term associated with exogenous noise and unobservable features. 
We then perform dynamic panel data estimations for the whole research period to minimize 
possible endogeneity, a common limitation in static models as the one used by Rose (2016). 
As happens in practice, implementation of good governance recommendations may have 
some delayed effect on the performance of the company. In addition, the dynamic dimension 
of a panel data distinguishes how observance to governance guidelines affects performance 
across time. However, including the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
will make fixed effect estimators biased and inconsistent (Nickell, 1981), particularly in the 
context of a short period. We overcome this limitation by using the Dynamic Panel Data 
(DPD) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and implemented in Stata by 
Roodman (2009). All our models are estimated with the two-step system Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which combines equations in differences of the 
variables with equations in levels of the variables (see Baum et al., 2007).  
 




Finally, to further increase the robustness of our analysis, we add a third proxy for 
performance (TOBINQ). We also use a new set of control variables (Zi) commonly identified 
in prior research (Yermack, 1996; Klapper and Love, 2004), including the lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable. Our baseline model takes the following form: 
 
TOBINQi/ROAi/ROEi = α + β(CompUGGC)i + γ Zi + Tj + εi   (2) 
3.3.1. Compliance variables 
We have assembled a complete hand-collected dataset that contains answers to the 
governance recommendations from annual corporate governance reports for the 145 Spanish 
listed firms analyzed. In general, we score the companies’ compliance with the UGGC’s 
guidelines as either 1) a full compliance with a recommendation (1.0 points) or 2) non-
compliance or partial compliance with a recommendation (0 points). In order to quantify the 
level of compliance for a company we first sum up all the followed recommendations, then 
divide it by the total amount of recommendations that pertain to the company. Hence, we 
subtract those guidelines that are not applicable to a company from the total 58 
recommendations. The maximum score a company can receive is therefore 1.0, equivalent 
to 100 percent of compliance with all considered recommendations. We also calculate 
partial compliance for each of five areas defined before using the same algorithm. 
3.3.2. Proxies for performance 
As Rose (2016), we use ROA and ROE as proxies for performance. In addition, we use 
Tobin´s Q as an alternative proxy, following the mainstream practice in corporate 
governance research, in our DPD estimations. 
ROA 
Return on Assets is a measure of operating performance, reflecting the level of profitability 
that the company obtains from its assets. Similar to prior research (see Larcker et al., 2007; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), we calculate ROA as operating income divided by total assets at 
book value at the end of fiscal year. We use EBIT as our proxy for the companies’ operating 
income.  
ROE 
Return on Equity is another measure of operating performance, which reflects the level of 
profitability that the company obtains from funds invested by common shareholders. For the 
current study, we use the definition of ROE followed by most researchers in this area (see 
 




Brown and Caylor, 2009). We calculate ROE as the ratio of the company´s net income 
divided by the book value of common equity. 
TOBINQ 
A pure Tobin's Q measures the quotient of the market value of assets divided by the 
replacement value of the same assets. We follow a simplification of this measure commonly 
used in the finance literature (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; La Porta et al., 2002), to 
ensure data availability for most of our sample. Hence, we measure Tobin´s Q as the sum of 
the book value of total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the sum of 
book value of common equity and deferred taxes, over book value of total assets. The market 
value of equity is the product of the company´s share price and the total common shares 
outstanding (or market capitalization) and the replacement value of assets is represented by 
the book value of the total assets. All book values for fiscal year t are matched with the 
market values of common equity at the end of year t.   
3.3.3. Control variables  
As in Rose (2016), control variables included in Equation (1) are firm size (SIZE), measured 
by the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization, a dummy variable (OneShare) 
to highlight proportionality between ownership and control (“one share – one vote”) and 
industry dummies.  
Control variables for our DPD models 
Both corporate governance and performance are likely to be correlated with other critical 
firm metrics. Thus, to add robustness to our reported results and to mitigate the problem of 
possible endogeneity we add an appropriate set of control variables consistent with prior 
studies (Aggarwal et al., 2007; Klapper and Love, 2004; Yermack, 1996). We use the 
following set of control variables for the estimation of our dynamic models in Equation (2). 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, as suggested by Brown 
and Caylor (2006). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), large firms are more prone 
to deal with greater agency problems on the back of larger free cash flows. In addition, they 
tend to be in matured industries with low returns and potential, so we expect a negative 
relationship with performance. Furthermore, there is considerable literature emphasizing the 
positive effects of growth opportunities, as companies with solid growth prospects 
(GROWTH) usually hire better management teams and show higher performance (Core et 
al., 1999). We follow Klapper and Love (2004) and use the average annual sales growth 
 




over the past three years. The interaction between size and growth (SIZE x GROWTH) is 
also included. We define firm age (AGE) as the number of years passed since the year of 
incorporation (natural logarithmic values). Consistent with Fama and French (2004), 
performance is likely to deteriorate at the margin in older firms, presumably due to a 
worsening of corporate governance features, among other factors. We also include the 
financial leverage (LEVER), defined as the firm’s book value of long-term debt divided by 
the sum of market value of equity and book value of long term debt. We expect a positive 
relationship with performance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), debt service 
commitment should impose higher accountability for management teams, and also create 
value, deterring managers from making poor investment decisions. Finally, we include the 
dependent variable one-year and two-year lagged as control variables to reduce potential 
endogeneity between our governance variables and performance measures. According to 
Daines et al. (2010), current performance significantly affects a firm´s future level of 
profitability. Similar to prior work, we winsorize extreme (1st and 99th) percentiles of the 
pooled distribution of all control variables to neutralize the impact of possible spurious 
outliers.9 
3.3.4. Dataset  
Our sample consists of 149 listed companies on the Mercado Continuo at the Madrid Stock 
Exchange during the period between 2007 and 2012, for which data was available. We have 
selected 2007 as our starting year since it marks the beginning of compliance with the 
Spanish UGGC’s public disclosures. We decided to end our research period in 2012 taking 
into consideration the changes made to the Spanish UGGC beginning in 2013. Table 1 
presents a summary of variable names, codes, brief descriptions, and sources of data. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
Four companies were dropped due to the lack of financial data. Thus, our initial sample was 
reduced to 145 companies, and given the six-year research period, a potential 870 
observations. However, for some years, information for at least one of our variables could 
not be obtained. Consequently, 766 firm-year observations are used.10  
We analyze companies by industry, using the Industry Classification Benchmark prepared 
by FTSE that comprises 10 major industries. These firms operate in a variety of industries: 
                                                          
9 We test the DPD models for interaction with industries for our aggregate measure as well as each area of compliance 
and found that compliance effects do not vary over industry. 
10 In Tables 6 and 7, for our contrast Rose (2016) models, our dataset is reduced to 755 firm-year observations. 
 




Basic Materials (8), Consumer Goods (18), Consumer Services (18), Financials (37), Health 
Care (10), Industrials (31), Oil and Gas (9), Technology (4), Telecommunications (4), and 
Utilities (6), as shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the overall dataset. In general, the overall 
compliance with the UGGC during the period is remarkably high (a mean of 8.0 points out 
of 10) for the 145 large Spanish listed companies analyzed and even the 10th percentile 
reaches a value of 0.6.  Companies do best in area 1 guidelines, referred to the statutes, with 
a mean of 0.88 for the overall dataset, while we report the weakest compliance (a mean of 
0.71) for area 4 recommendations, referred to the remuneration practices. The average firm 
size is $7.16 billion, and the average leverage ratio is 34.7%. Furthermore, the average ROA 
is 3.57%, the ROE is 6.22% and the average Tobin’s Q is 1.19.  We also document an 
improving trend in the level of compliance during the period in Table 4, moving from a 
mean of 0.77 in 2007 to 0.84 in 2012, and with all 5 areas of compliance showing progresses. 
We have obtained the financial data from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database. 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 around here 
Table 5 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix between the main variables used in our 
models for the entire sample of 766 initial observations. As expected, the CompUGGC index 
variable is correlated with the five major compliance areas. We also analyze the correlation 
between the five areas to rule out any potential substitution effects between governance main 
features. No significant negative correlation is found, suggesting that the areas are not 
substitutes or redundant. More importantly, the overall CompUGGC and most compliance 
areas are uncorrelated with the performance variables, except for area 3 recommendations, 
which reflects a negative significant correlation with ROA. This means that higher 
compliance with recommendations on directors should translate into lower firm 
performance. Also, the compliance with area 2 guidelines reflect a positive significant 
correlation with TOBINQ, indicating that higher compliance with recommendations on 
board structure would be consistent with higher firm performance measured by TOBINQ. 
The data also hint that, not surprisingly, performance metrics are highly intercorrelated. 
Regarding the control variables, the aggregate CompUGGC, as well as most partial 
compliance ratios, show a significant relationship with size, age, and leverage. Overall, these 
results are meant to be descriptive and should be used as a guidance for the models’ 
specification, which are covered in the next section. Overall, the correlations between the 
 




independent variables are relatively low, which suggests the absence of serious 
multicollinearity in the data.  
Insert Table 5 around here 
3.4. Empirical results 
Following the proposed methodology, in this section we address the effects of the 
compliance with the UGGC on the selected performance metrics. 
3.4.1. Contrast with the model of Rose (2016) 
Our model can be considered an extension of that developed by Rose (2016) to estimate the 
impact on performance caused by the level of governance compliance controlling for firm 
size and vote control. In his model, performance is proxied by ROA and ROE. Hence, our 
first model (Model 1) studies the primary relationship between compliance with the UGGC 
and ROA/ROE in a cross-sectional regression for each of the six years in our dataset given 
by Equation (1).  Tables 6 and 7 display the results of our estimations with ROA/ROE as 
proxies for performance.  
Contrary to Rose (2016), we do not find a positive significant relation between compliance 
with the Spanish UGGC code and ROA/ROE. On the contrary, our regression results mostly 
reflect a negative relationship that turns significant during some years of our time series.11 
This contradicts our Hypothesis 1, as it indicates that firms with a higher compliance with 
governance recommendations (CompUGGC) are associated with weaker performance.  
As for control variables, we find a significantly positive relationship between SIZE and 
performance in all models, similar to Rose (2016). This indicates that larger firms exhibit 
higher performance as measured by ROA/ROE, contradicting our expectation. Finally, 
contrary to Rose (2016), we do not report any significant relationship with the one share – 
one vote (OneShare) control variable in any year. As for the partial ratings, we report similar 
results in almost all years.12 
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 around here 
                                                          
11 As a general rule, for the usual significant levels (0.01 or 0.05) we do not provide the specific mark. 
12 For the sake of simplicity, results for this set of robustness checks are not reported in tables. However, they are 
available upon request from the authors. 
 




3.4.2. Results of our baseline GMM model 
We continue our investigation by implementing a dynamic model where we explore the 
influence of the compliance with the UGGC recommendations on firm performance metrics, 
controlling for firm’s prior performance. As in the former model, our premise is that 
compliance with the local governance recommendations should have a positive and 
significant impact on future performance. 
Estimations are conducted using dynamic panel data (DPD) models given by Equation (2), 
to take advantage of the time dimension of each observation. The reliability of our 
econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity of the instruments, which can 
be evaluated with the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions. We also present AR(2) 
statistics for second-order serial correlation in the error process. In each of our GMM 
models, the Hansen J statistic and the Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests show that our instruments 
are appropriate and no second order serial correlation is detected, respectively. 
In Tables 8 through 10, we summarize the results of the estimation of our proposed six 
models. Our first model (Model 1) studies the primary relationship between compliance with 
the UGGC and our tested firm performance metrics. To evaluate the separate impact of each 
of the five UGGC guideline areas, we replace the aggregate compliance metric with each of 
the five UGGC areas (CompUGGC1 through CompUGGC5) compliance metrics (Models 
2-6).  
Table 8 displays the results of the estimation of Equation (2) using TOBINQ as the 
performance measure. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the main result is the lack of a significant 
relationship between the level of aggregate compliance with the UGGC (CompUGGC) and 
TOBINQ, as reflected in Model 1. This relationship remains non-significant when we 
analyze each of the five UGGC areas in Models 2-6.  
In terms of the influence of the control variables, we observe the expected significant direct 
relationship with the first lagged performance (TOBINQ(t-1)) in all six models. This positive 
relationship remains significant (p-value < 0.10) for second lagged variable (TOBINQ(t-2)). 
We also find a significantly inverse relationship between SIZE and performance in all 
models. This indicates that larger firms exhibit weaker performance measured by TOBINQ, 
consistent with our prediction. There is also a significant negative relationship with 
GROWTH, signaling that firms with stronger growth opportunities exhibit weaker 
performance measured by TOBINQ, which contradicts our prediction. Our results also show 
that the interaction between SIZE and GROWTH (SIZE x GROWTH) is significant, 
 




highlighting how the effect of growth is moderated by size, leading to bias in models that 
only consider these factors separately. We also find a direct relationship between LEVER 
and performance in all models. This indicates that firms with high level of financial leverage 
exhibit greater performance as measured by TOBINQ, confirming our expectation.  
Insert Table 8 around here  
Table 9 depicts the results of the estimation of Equation (2) with ROA as the dependent 
variable. The main result is the existence of a negative significant relationship between 
CompUGGC and ROA, as reflected in Model 1. This contradicts our Hypothesis 1, as it 
shows that firms with a higher level of compliance with UGGC exhibit weaker future 
performance. As for the partial compliance ratios, we report significant negative results in 
Models 3 (p-value < 0.10), 4, and 6. This contradicts our Hypotheses 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5, 
indicating that firms with high level of compliance with the UGGC recommendations on the 
board, the directors, and committees (area 2, area 3, and area 5) exhibit weaker performance 
as measured by ROA. These results are very similar to the ones reported for the static model 
using Rose’s (2016) approach.  
As for control variables, we only find a significant influence of lagged performance ROA(t-
1) and ROA(t-2) with the predicted positive sign in all models.  
Insert Table 9 around here 
Table 10 displays the results of the estimation of Equation (2) with ROE as the dependent 
variable. Model 1 shows a non-significant positive relationship between the level of 
aggregate compliance (CompUGGC) and ROE. Similar results are observed for partial 
compliance ratios except for Model 2 referred to area 1 (CompUGGC1). This supports our 
Hypothesis 1.1, as it indicates that firms with a higher level of compliance with bylaws and 
shareholders meeting’ recommendations should exhibit stronger future performance. 
As for control variables, we confirm the significant direct influence of lagged performance 
ROA(t-1) and ROA(t-2) in all six models. We also find a direct relationship when we examine 
the interaction effects of size and growth (SIZE x GROWTH) on performance. This indicates 
that whatever the impact from growth it should be moderated by size.  
Insert Table 10 around here 
We run several additional tests (results untabulated) to check the robustness of our findings. 
Firstly, we conduct additional analyses for a subsample of firms excluding financials and 
utilities due to their distinctive corporate governance structures and accounting practices. In 
 




general, the subsample results excluding this set of companies are qualitatively similar to 
those presented for the entire set of firms.  
Secondly, we define a new variable for compliance with UGGC taking into account those 
recommendations with reported partial compliance (CompUGGC_P). Then, we score 
compliance with the UGGC’s guidelines into the following three categories: 1) a full 
compliance with a recommendation (1.0 points), 2) a partial compliance with a 
recommendation (0.5 points) or 3) a breach of a recommendation (0 points). We then sum 
up all the recommendations that are fully or partially followed and then divide it by the total 
amount of recommendations that pertain to the company. As in the case of our main analysis, 
we run six models for our overall level of compliance and then for each of the five main 
areas the UGGC recommendations. In general, the estimation of the models with these new 
metrics for CompUGGC_P for the overall and five areas of partial compliance show similar 
results as the original model for the three performance measures analyzed.   
Finally, we conduct a robustness check to rule out the notion that conditions necessary for a 
significant governance-performance relationship are subject to achieve a level of 
governance quality beyond a certain threshold. Consistent with the portfolio approach 
proposed by Gompers et al. (2003), we split the original sample into two groups: “good” 
quality of governance, consistent with the higher level of compliance, and “weaker” quality 
of governance, reflecting the lower half of companies according to CompUGGC.  
We then conduct sequential estimations of Equation (2) for these “good” and “weaker” 
qualities of governance clusters. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that higher 
compliant firms reflect a greater performance compared to lower compliant firms. All the 
estimations fail to establish a significant relationship between CompUGGC and 
performance. Similarly, we do not observe any significant relationship between any of the 
partial compliance ratings and performance. The only two exceptions occur in the 
estimations conducted with the sample of “weaker” governed firms for the models with ROA 
and ROE as the dependent variable, and in both cases, the sign of the relationship is negative, 
contradicting our expectations. Overall, these robustness tests provide support to the results 
reported in the main analysis regarding a lack of a significant relationship between 
compliance with corporate governance codes and firm performance. All the results of the 
robustness tests for the baseline model are presented in the Appendix. 
Summing up, both our cross-sectional estimations following Rose’s (2016) model and the 
estimations from panel data models using an expanded set of control variables, report the 
 




lack of a positively significant relationship between compliance with UGGC 
recommendations and performance, regardless of how we measure it. We do find a 
significant relationship for ROA but with a negative sign, contradicting our expectations. 
We report a few significant relationships for some of the areas of compliance. However, in 
most cases, the sign of the relationship is contrary to our predictions. 
Our results contradict the main outcome in Rose’s (2016) of a positive and significant 
relationship between compliance and performance. It should be noted, however, that Rose’s 
finding was not too robust, as significance at the usual statistical levels (p-value < 0.05) was 
observed in the model with ROA as the proxy for performance, but not in the model using 
ROE.  
On the other hand, our results support some prior related studies, which have put into 
question the very usefulness not only of codes of good practices but also of the “comply-or-
explain” approach behind these codes. Hence, Martinez-Blasco et al. (2017) did not observe 
a significant impact on short-term stock returns associated with the presentation of 
declarations of compliance with the UGGC. Bianchi et al. (2011) proposed a possible 
explanation for the lack of significant relationship between compliance and performance by 
questioning the very validity of the self-evaluation approach behind the “comply-or-
explain” philosophy associated with codes of good practices. According to the authors, the 
companies' level of effective compliance with the Italian governance code’s 
recommendations is considerably lower than their reported levels of formal compliance. In 
the same line, Van del Poel and Vanstraelen (2011) and Shrives and Brennan (2017), argued 
that companies release generic explanations for noncompliance or give no explanation at 
all, questioning the very effectiveness of the “comply-or-explain” philosophy.  
3.5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we empirically examine the association between compliance with Spanish 
UGGC and firm performance, as we believe it is important for investors to assess if such 
hypothesized positive economic impact does materialize. To carry out our investigation, we 
use UGGC compliance indexes over the period 2007-2012, a period of positive evolution in 
Spanish corporate governance. We first followed Rose’s (2016) approach conducting cross-
sectional estimations. We then implemented a dynamic framework to allow the adjustment 
of the firm’s performance to changes in corporate governance as well as to incorporate the 
influence of past performance. 
 




Overall, our GMM models strongly reject the static model. Hence, a lesson to be learned 
from this paper is that the effects of corporate governance on performance seem to be weak 
without considering the dynamics from lagged performance. We show that when these 
lagged dependent metrics and a set of significant control variables are included in the model, 
each has an important role to play, as do their interactions.  
To summarize, there is no evidence from our models that compliance with the UGGC has 
any significant impact on performance. Neither the static models following Rose’s (2016) 
approach, nor the DPD models, confirm such a positive significant relationship. We consider 
the results of this investigation to be strong, as all robustness checks have yielded steady 
results, increasing our confidence in the absence of a UGGC compliance and performance 
relation. Overall, our findings are in line with some prior evidence questioning the impact 
of compliance with UGGC on firm performance, and, in particular, with the recent study of 
Martinez-Blasco et al. (2017) for Spain that showed that the publications of declarations of 
compliance with the same UGGC do not have a significant impact on short-term stocks 
returns.  
We believe that our study might have interesting implications at various levels. On the one 
hand, since our main conclusion somehow contradicts Rose’s (2016), it clearly encourages 
further research on this issue. It also stresses the importance of country-specific issues (i.e., 
culture and business ethics, as well as the level of disclosure and outsiders’ difficulty to 
verify the information) to understand the compliance with the governance code-performance 
relationship and thus, the difficulties of generalizing country-specific evidence. On the other 
hand, our results suggest that in order to strengthen investor confidence, local regulators 
should be more active in penalizing poor explanations and make sure that the mandatory 
corporate governance reports do not become a mechanical tick-the-box exercise, 
jeopardizing the effectiveness of the “comply or explain” approach.  
The limitations of the current study lay in the nature of our sample data, represented by 
major companies in terms of market capitalization for the Spanish corporate landscape, 
which tend to be relatively homogenous in terms of size, age, and to a certain extent the 
generally high degree of compliance with local governance code. On this regard, expanding 
the sample data beyond the very large (and usually older) corporations included in this 
dataset should be welcomed in future research.   
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Table 1.  Description of variables 
 
Variable Code Definition Data Source 
Corporate Governance Variables     
Compliance 
UGGC CompUGGC 
Level of compliance with overall UGGC 58 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Compliance 
UGGC1 CompUGGC1 
Level of compliance with UGGC Area 1 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Compliance 
UGGC2 CompUGGC2 
Level of compliance with UGGC Area 2 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Compliance 
UGGC3 CompUGGC3 
Level of compliance with UGGC Area 3 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Compliance 
UGGC4 CompUGGC4 
Level of compliance with UGGC Area 4 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Compliance 
UGGC5 CompUGGC5 
Level of compliance with UGGC Area 5 
recommendations for 2007-12 CNMV reports 
Variables for Company  Performance     
Return on Assets ROA 
Ratio of company´s operating income over total 
assets at book value. 
S&P Capital IQ 
Return on Equity ROE 
Ratio of company´s income before extraordinary 
items available for common equity over book 
value of common equity. 
S&P Capital IQ 
Tobin´s Q TOBINQ 
Quotient of market value of assets (measured as 
the sum of book value of total assets plus the 
market value of common equity minus the sum of 
book value of common equity and deferred taxes) 
and the replacement value of assets (book value 
of total assets). 
S&P Capital IQ 
Control Variables       
One Share One 
Vote 
OneShare 
Dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the company does not have dual class voting 
shares and 0 otherwise 
CNMV reports 
Firm Size SIZE 
Measured by natural logarithm of market 
capitalization (Rose, 2016) or natural logarithm of 
total assets (our DPD models) 
S&P Capital IQ 
Growth 
Opportunity GROWTH Average Sales Growth in the last 3 years 
S&P Capital IQ 
Firm Age AGE 
Defined as number of years passed since the 
firm´s founding year S&P Capital IQ 
Level of 
Leverage LEVER 
[Long Term Debt / Market Value of Equity plus 
Long Term Debt] S&P Capital IQ 
ROA (t-1) ROA (t-1) 1-year lagged ROA S&P Capital IQ 
ROA (t-2) ROA (t-2) 2-year lagged ROA S&P Capital IQ 
ROE (t-1) ROE (t-1) 1-year lagged ROE S&P Capital IQ 
ROE (t-2) ROE (t-2) 2-year lagged ROE S&P Capital IQ 
Tobin´s Q (t-1) TOBINQ (t-1) 1-year lagged Tobin´s Q S&P Capital IQ 









Table 2.  Dataset breakdown by sectors 
 
Sectors Firms Firm-years Percent 
Basic Materials 8 44 5.74 
Consumer Goods 18 96 12.53 
Consumer Services 18 88 11.49 
Financials 37 186 24.28 
Health Care 10 58 7.57 
Industrials 31 173 22.58 
Oil and Gas 9 51 6.66 
Technology 4 21 2.74 
Telecommunications 4 19 2.48 
Utilities 6 30 3.92 












Table 3.  Descriptive statistics  
 
Variables 
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max p10 p90 
Corporate Governance Variables             
CompUGGC 766 0.80 0.84 0.14 0.34 1.00 0.60 0.95 
CompUGGC1 766 0.88 1.00 0.16 0.20 1.00 0.67 1.00 
CompUGGC2 766 0.79 0.80 0.15 0.33 1.00 0.58 0.95 
CompUGGC3 766 0.81 0.86 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 
CompUGGC4 766 0.71 0.71 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 
CompUGGC5 766 0.83 0.87 0.15 0.18 1.00 0.63 1.00 
Company Performance Variables             
ROA 766 3.57 3.60 4.99 -5.36 11.40 -5.15 11.40 
ROE 766 6.22 8.37 19.10 -33.20 35.40 -31.40 33.50 
TOBINQ 766 1.19 1.07 0.36 0.78 1.94 0.78 1.88 
Control Variables                 
SIZE 766 7.16 6.96 1.97 4.37 10.60 4.45 10.60 
GROWTH 766 5.36 4.19 14.70 -18.50 29.60 -17.90 29.60 
AGE 766 3.89 3.99 0.73 2.48 4.88 2.64 4.88 
LEVER 766 34.70 33.70 18.90 6.05 66.30 7.00 65.40 
  
 




Table 4.  Variables' means over the sample period 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  N = 121 N = 127 N = 132 N = 129 N = 130 N = 127 
Variables Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Corporate Governance Variables         
CompUGGC 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.84 
CompUGGC1 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 
CompUGGC2 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 
CompUGGC3 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.85 
CompUGGC4 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.81 
CompUGGC5 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Company Performance Variables         
ROA 5.53 3.93 2.92 3.27 3.26 2.61 
ROE 13.23 7.76 3.84 6.26 4.11 2.62 
TOBINQ 1.40 1.16 1.18 1.17 1.12 1.12 
Control Variables             
SIZE 7.25 7.21 7.18 7.17 7.12 7.05 
GROWTH 15.90 12.66 4.21 -0.73 -0.37 1.27 
AGE 3.87 3.88 3.89 3.89 3.89 3.90 








Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
 CompUGGC  CompUGGC1  CompUGGC2  CompUGGC3  CompUGGC4  CompUGGC5   ROA   ROE  TOBINQ   SIZE   AGE  GROWTH 
 CompUGGC1    0.50*                  1.00            
  0.00             
 CompUGGC2   0.90*   0.32*               
  0.00  0.00            
 CompUGGC3   0.79*   0.43*   0.63*                 1.00          
  0.00  0.00  0.00           
 CompUGGC4   0.76*   0.34*   0.59*   0.59*                  1.00         
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00          
 CompUGGC5   0.81*   0.30*   0.66*   0.48*   0.48*                 1.00        
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00                
ROA (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.11)* 0.01  (0.01) 1.00       
  0.20  0.16  0.39  0.00  0.80  0.71        
ROE 0.00  (0.04) 0.02  (0.06) 0.05  0.01  0.52* 1.00      
  0.90  0.26  0.63  0.11  0.14  0.82  0.00       
TOBINQ (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)* (0.01) 0.06  (0.06) 0.39* 0.40* 1.00     
  0.25  0.11  0.04  0.80  0.08  0.11  0.00  0.00         
SIZE 0.36* 0.06  0.33* 0.28* 0.36* 0.28* 0.11* 0.22* (0.08)* 1.00     
  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02     
AGE (0.15)* (0.12)* (0.12)* (0.16)* (0.09)* (0.11)* 0.08* 0.01  (0.05) 0.13* 1.00   
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.86  0.10  0.00    
GROWTH 0.04  0.10* 0.07* 0.03  (0.03) (0.00) 0.28* 0.17* 0.08* 0.10* (0.08)* 1.00  
  0.30  0.01  0.05  0.34  0.40  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.02   
LEVER  0.07* (0.07)* 0.00  0.11* 0.11* 0.09* (0.32)* (0.20)* (0.05) (0.08)* (0.09)* (0.19)* 
  0.05  0.05  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.02  0.01  0.00  
* p<0.05             
 




Table 6. Model 1' results on the influence of Compliance with UGGC on ROA  
 
VARIABLES 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CompUGGC -0.881 -0.737 -6.894 -6.995** -7.472*** -4.720* 
 (-0.269) (-0.205) (-1.509) (-2.386) (-2.671) (-1.729) 
SIZE 0.597** 1.032*** 1.215*** 1.455*** 1.272*** 1.299*** 
 (2.206) (3.744) (4.491) (7.128) (5.995) (6.624) 
OneShare -1.057 -0.505 -0.673 0.093 -2.664 -0.243 
 (-0.917) (-0.637) (-0.432) (0.117) (-0.945) (-0.171) 
Industry-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 8.393** 4.473 6.937 0.492 5.027 1.521 
 (2.361) (1.367) (1.270) (0.183) (1.107) (0.511) 
Observations (N) 115 123 127 130 132 128 
Adjusted R-2 0.209 0.252 0.239 0.390 0.336 0.372 
F-Statistic 18.16*** 15.01*** 9.69*** 12.45*** 10.44*** 8.95*** 






Table 7. Model 1' results on the influence of Compliance with UGGC on ROE 
 
VARIABLES 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CompUGGC 3.754 9.358 -14.669 -22.131** -6.199 -4.726 
 (0.312) (0.702) (-0.879) (-1.982) (-0.409) (-0.290) 
SIZE 4.004*** 4.561*** 5.605*** 5.350*** 4.766*** 2.927** 
 (4.768) (4.787) (5.202) (5.599) (4.423) (2.523) 
OneShare 0.432 0.397 -8.642 -1.205 -6.766 -2.068 
 (0.191) (0.111) (-1.387) (-0.374) (-1.225) (-0.330) 
Industry-control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.585 -8.073 0.625 -10.824 -23.151 7.436 
 (-0.135) (-0.606) (0.032) (-1.077) (-1.526) (0.436) 
Observations (N) 115 123 127 130 132 128 
Adjusted R-2 0.252 0.282 0.262 0.200 0.158 0.037 
F-Statistic 19.43*** 9.255*** 7.438*** 4.045*** 3.418*** 1.985** 










Table 8: Robust two-step GMM estimates on the influence of Compliance with UGGC on 
performance as measured by Tobins' Q 
 Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
CompUGGC(t-1) -0.00383      
 (-0.057)      
CompUGGC1(t-1)  -0.0390     
  (-0.72)     
CompUGGC2(t-1)   -0.00155    
   (-0.023)    
CompUGGC3(t-1)    -0.0145   
    (-0.35)   
CompUGGC4(t-1)     0.0233  
     (0.58)  
CompUGGC5(t-1)      0.0117 
      (0.20) 
TOBINQ(t-1) 0.780*** 0.782*** 0.781*** 0.781*** 0.781*** 0.782*** 
 (12.7) (12.6) (12.6) (12.7) (12.5) (12.8) 
TOBINQ(t-2) 0.109* 0.108* 0.109* 0.109* 0.106* 0.108* 
 (1.77) (1.75) (1.77) (1.77) (1.72) (1.75) 
SIZE -0.0112** -0.0110** -0.0113** -0.0108** -0.0123*** -0.0114** 
 (-2.40) (-2.51) (-2.41) (-2.39) (-2.72) (-2.45) 
GROWTH -0.00540** -0.00531** -0.00548** -0.00533** -0.00525** -0.00537** 
 (-2.19) (-2.14) (-2.22) (-2.14) (-2.13) (-2.16) 
SIZE x GROWTH 0.00069** 0.00069** 0.00071** 0.00069** 0.00068** 0.00069** 
 (2.26) (2.22) (2.30) (2.21) (2.21) (2.23) 
AGE -0.0205 -0.0216* -0.0202 -0.0213* -0.0195 -0.0202 
 (-1.55) (-1.73) (-1.54) (-1.68) (-1.48) (-1.56) 
LEVER 0.00126** 0.00123** 0.00127** 0.00127** 0.00123** 0.00124** 
 (2.46) (2.41) (2.48) (2.47) (2.40) (2.43) 
Constant 0.386*** 0.420*** 0.382*** 0.394*** 0.370*** 0.373*** 
 (3.50) (4.19) (3.48) (4.30) (4.05) (3.68) 
Firm-years 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Hansen J 23.15 23.05 23.12 23.09 23.23 23.21 
J df 18 18 18 18 18 18 
J pvalue 0.185 0.189 0.186 0.187 0.182 0.183 
AR(2) pvalue 0.211 0.210 0.211 0.210 0.217 0.212 
Notes: Time fixed effects and a constant term are included in all specifications. Two-step GMM-SYS 
estimates of CompUGGC are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 




Table 9: Robust two-step GMM estimates on the influence of Compliance with UGGC on 
performance as measured by ROA 
 Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
CompUGGC(t-1) -2.858***      
 (-2.59)      
CompUGGC1(t-1)  0.180     
  (0.17)     
CompUGGC2(t-1)   -1.534*    
   (-1.67)    
CompUGGC3(t-1)    -1.961***   
    (-2.78)   
CompUGGC4(t-1)     -0.568  
     (-0.97)  
CompUGGC5(t-1)      -2.799*** 
      (-2.87) 
ROA(t-1) 0.669*** 0.679*** 0.675*** 0.664*** 0.671*** 0.666*** 
 (8.98) (9.21) (9.02) (8.90) (9.14) (9.08) 
ROA(t-2) 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.179*** 
 (2.69) (2.64) (2.61) (2.64) (2.71) (2.81) 
SIZE 0.127* 0.0423 0.0837 0.111 0.0695 0.112 
 (1.78) (0.70) (1.25) (1.61) (1.04) (1.60) 
GROWTH -0.0248 -0.0169 -0.0224 -0.0282 -0.0201 -0.0169 
 (-0.58) (-0.37) (-0.49) (-0.67) (-0.46) (-0.38) 
SIZE x GROWTH 0.00689 0.00574 0.00663 0.00730 0.00626 0.00586 
 (1.37) (1.08) (1.26) (1.44) (1.23) (1.14) 
AGE 0.0216 0.127 0.0777 0.00178 0.102 0.0634 
 (0.12) (0.76) (0.46) (0.0098) (0.60) (0.35) 
LEVER -0.00890 -0.00842 -0.00900 -0.00776 -0.00823 -0.00800 
 (-1.12) (-1.04) (-1.11) (-1.00) (-1.04) (-0.97) 
Constant 2.127* -0.291 1.076 1.571 0.268 2.006* 
 (1.79) (-0.21) (1.10) (1.54) (0.30) (1.72) 
Firm-years 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Hansen J 21.44 22.36 22.50 21.16 21.75 22.00 
J df 18 18 18 18 18 18 
J pvalue 0.258 0.216 0.211 0.271 0.243 0.232 
AR(2) pvalue 0.184 0.197 0.198 0.186 0.182 0.180 
Notes: Time fixed effects and a constant term are included in all specifications. Two-step GMM-SYS 
estimates of CompUGGC are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses. 








Table 10: Robust two-step GMM estimates on the influence of Compliance with UGGC on 
performance as measured by ROE 
 Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
CompUGGC(t-1) 4.227      
 (0.71)      
CompUGGC1(t-1)  13.55***     
  (3.29)     
CompUGGC2(t-1)   2.728    
   (0.55)    
CompUGGC3(t-1)    -3.425   
    (-1.01)   
CompUGGC4(t-1)     3.665  
     (1.11)  
CompUGGC5(t-1)      2.182 
      (0.39) 
ROE(t-1) 0.564*** 0.568*** 0.563*** 0.558*** 0.565*** 0.561*** 
 (9.30) (9.42) (9.30) (9.13) (9.29) (9.21) 
ROE(t-2) 0.134* 0.141** 0.135* 0.129* 0.127* 0.134** 
 (1.95) (2.18) (1.95) (1.87) (1.87) (1.97) 
SIZE 0.238 0.177 0.288 0.540 0.169 0.307 
 (0.52) (0.46) (0.65) (1.19) (0.40) (0.71) 
GROWTH -0.485 -0.484 -0.486 -0.493 -0.482 -0.497* 
 (-1.60) (-1.55) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.58) (-1.65) 
SIZE x GROWTH 0.0835** 0.0819* 0.0832** 0.0841** 0.0828* 0.0857** 
 (1.98) (1.92) (1.99) (1.99) (1.96) (2.02) 
AGE -1.504 -1.103 -1.595 -1.948* -1.448 -1.563 
 (-1.40) (-1.07) (-1.53) (-1.90) (-1.39) (-1.44) 
LEVER -0.0157 -0.00743 -0.0133 -0.0145 -0.0186 -0.0162 
 (-0.38) (-0.17) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.44) (-0.39) 
Constant 3.206 -7.009 4.484 9.266* 4.185 4.649 
 (0.49) (-1.25) (0.78) (1.94) (0.85) (0.69) 
Firm-years 602 602 602 602 602 602 
Hansen J 20.24 21.40 20.25 20.53 20.29 20.39 
J df 18 18 18 18 18 18 
J pvalue 0.319 0.260 0.319 0.304 0.317 0.311 
AR(2) pvalue 0.615 0.617 0.611 0.615 0.619 0.610 
Notes: Time fixed effects and a constant term are included in all specifications. Two-step GMM-SYS 
estimates of CompUGGC are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 




Chapter 4. Commercial governance ratings as predictors of firm performance: 
Evidence from a global setting 
4.1. Abstract 
The swift globalization trend and cross-country investments have amplified the claim for 
common standards on corporate governance assessment. As a result, commercial ratings 
marketed by influential consultant companies, have become increasingly popular among 
participants in the capital markets as a proxy for governance. In this paper, we analyze 
the ability of these ratings to predict the performance of the firm. We base the empirical 
analysis on the constituents of the Standard & Poors’ 1200 global index and utilize the 
latest edition of the leading commercial governance rating Quickscore released by 
Institutional Shareholders Service. The main result is the lack of a significant association 
between commercial governance ratings and firm performance. This suggests scarce 
information content on commercial governance ratings for investors. In addition, we have 
not obtained any indication that legal tradition plays a relevant role on this matter. This 
paper is expected to shed light on the discussion whether commercial governance ratings 
are a valid tool for corporate governance evaluation. 
Keywords: corporate governance; commercial ratings; ISS Quickscore; performance; 
legal tradition. 
  





Corporate governance indicators are becoming increasingly important for investors when 
making investment decisions. Given the growing process of globalization and economic 
integration, shareholders and, in general, market participants need the best possible 
assessment of the actual governance quality of the firms in which they are investing or 
planning to invest. In addition, deterioration in firm’s accountability caused by noticeable 
corporate scandals has enforced an international crusade for more rigorous corporate 
governance structures and practices. Investors are concerned with governance because 
weak governance can damage a firm’s financial position and result in firms incurring 
higher cost of capital (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).  
This is why identifying the right metrics of investor’s protection and governance quality 
that lead to better performance have become one of the main challenges of corporate 
governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). It has also become a recognized field of 
investigation in contemporary financial economics. Numerous studies have investigated 
this relationship through well-established lines of research (Bozec and Bozec, 2012): 1) 
studies that use single governance provisions; 2) investigations using so-called academic 
corporate governance indexes; and 3) empirical research using commercial governance 
ratings. 
While the first two lines of research have been extensively developed, only a limited 
attention has been given to the use of commercial ratings as a proxy for governance and 
predictors of firm-level performance. Remarkably, this is happening at a time when a 
growing acceptance of governance rating systems developed by a number of consultant 
agencies led by the Institutional Shareholders Service (ISS) is materializing.  
In addition, most prior empirical research on this topic has a narrow scope, focusing on 
country-specific data, specifically on the US and few European countries (mostly UK and 
Germany). There are only few cross-country investigations. Overall, due to the relevance 
that some of these ratings have reached within the investors’ community, together with 
the scarcity of previous research on this subject on a global setting, we believe that 
additional empirical evidence should be welcomed in order to draw sound conclusions 
regarding the ability of these ratings on predicting performance. While there are already 
some papers investigating this relationship using a global database (Klapper and Love, 
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009), 
they do so by testing this relationship using their self-constructed governance ratings.  
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We extend and refine the analysis in Núñez and García-Blandon (2017) assessing the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance focused on the 
European level, to the global scale. In addition, our work is closely related to Krafft et al. 
(2014) in their focus on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance using a large sample of companies worldwide. In their study, Krafft et al. 
(2014) explore the effects of corporate governance on performance focusing on 
convergence of non-US firms to US best governance practices. This is, to our knowledge, 
the second study that documents the relationship between a commercial governance 
rating and firm performance in a global setting. 
In this study, we investigate whether the quality of firm’s governance as measured by 
commercial governance ratings is associated to firm’s performance. Commercial 
governance ratings reflect an agency’s view of a company’s overall level of governance 
and its capacity to satisfy the country’s recommendations or binding rules on this matter. 
Based on the proposition that well-governed companies should reflect a stronger level of 
performance, we test the hypotheses that the firm’s governance quality (measured with a 
leading commercial rating) is positive and significantly related to an array of firm 
performance metrics. Contrary to most previous studies on this subject that handle 
relatively homogeneous US (e.g., Cremers and Nair, 2005; Epps and Cereola, 2008; 
Ertugrul and Hedge, 2009), or European (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Renders et al., 2010; 
Núñez and García-Blandon, 2017) companies’ datasets, we use a worldwide sample of 
companies.  
We provide new evidence obtained by using a sample of 1103 firms from the Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) 1200 Global Index. We proxy for governance risk by using the ISS 
Quickscore governance index (hereinafter QScore), as it currently stands as the leading 
commercial database in terms of firms and markets covered. Prior studies (Bebchuk et 
al., 2009) indicate that not all governance categories affect firm performance. Therefore, 
in addition to the aggregate governance rating (QScore), we also analyze what effect, if 
any, the four major pillars of governance: board structure, compensation, shareholders’ 
rights and audit practices, have on firms’ performance. We investigate the relationship 
between governance rating and firm performance using multivariate regression analysis. 
Our study also contributes to the debate over whether governance attributes are largely 
determined by country factors or by firm practices.  
Our attention has been addressed to two relevant issues. First, to test how this relationship 
applies to our overall global standardized dataset, and secondly, to investigate if there is 
any influence from legal tradition that could partially explain this relationship. We exploit 
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the institutional diversity in our sample following Bauer et al.’s (2004) approach, based 
on the comparison between the common law and the civil law models. 
As it has been extensively acknowledged in the corporate governance literature (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 1998), there is a major difference between the two 
main corporate law regimes: the civil law jurisdiction, where broader stakeholder’s 
interests are shared and governance recommendations are mostly voluntary, and the 
common law or Anglo-Saxon model, with an active market for corporate control and a 
more rigid legislation. As pointed out by Cremers et al. (2007, pg. 1359), “In general, the 
Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance has mainly focused on transparency and 
strengthening shareholder rights”. Hence, as in Núñez and Garcia-Blandon (2017), since 
we cannot assume that the set of governance mechanisms to protect investors work equal 
in both systems, we should not accept a priori that the results obtained in countries whose 
legal tradition is based on the common law, like the US and the UK, can be directly 
extrapolated to other countries. We show, however, that the results are maintained across 
the main legal origin groups.  
Another distinctive feature of this paper is that, compared to most prior research 
(Aggarwal et al., 2009; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009) that used a single indicator of 
performance, we use several metrics in order to report sounder results. In our study, the 
effects of the governance ratings on market and accounting metrics of performance are 
simultaneously investigated. We use Tobin’s Q (TQ)13, return on assets (ROA), and 
return on equity (ROE) as proxies of accounting performance. Additionally, a market 
driven measure, the Total Shareholders Return (TSR), is also used. It is anticipated that 
companies with higher governance quality (lower QScore ratings) reflect stronger 
performance, after accounting for the impact of control variables.  
This paper contributes to the extant research on international corporate governance in 
different ways. First, we update and contrast the results found in Krafft et al. (2014) for 
companies belonging to the S&P Global Index. While our research shares some 
similarities with Krafft et al. (2014), unlike them, we explore this relationship including 
US companies in our analysis. We also use the latest available version of leading ISS 
governance ratings (Quickscore 3.0). In comparison, these late governance scores are 
built upon the analysis of more than 200 governance factors, four times more than the 
2008-2013 ISS CGQ index used by Krafft et al. (2014) in their research. Since the 
                                                          
13 We refer customarily to TQ, ROA and ROE as firm-level accounting performance indicators. 
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complexity and reporting of ISS governance ratings have significantly increased during 
the last decade, results reported by prior studies need to be updated.  
We also refine Krafft et al.’s (2014) work by not only using an updated governance index 
and adding a large subset of companies, but also by considering the interaction of 
different governance mechanisms, thereby providing a more comprehensive analysis of 
the significance of corporate governance for firm performance. Hence, following Núñez 
and Garcia-Blandon (2017), we do not limit our study to the aggregate governance score 
but also address the scores of the four main governance sub-indexes (pillars). Such an 
approach should offer a more complete and precise picture of the relationship between 
the commercial governance ratings and performance. Finally, another main difference 
with Krafft et al. (2014) is that we control for past performance in our investigation. This 
reduces the sources of endogeneity that can yield spurious results (Schultz et al., 2010). 
After controlling for sector, firm-specific attributes, and prior-performance, our empirical 
results indicate that corporate governance quality as measured by our governance proxy 
(QScore) is not an important element in shaping up the firm’s performance. These results 
hold for the overall governance rating as well as for all four partial governance scores. 
They are also robust to various supplemental analyses, including segmenting and 
studying our sample based on its legal origin. Hence, our results are in line with the 
evidence reported by Núñez and Garcia-Blandon (2017) for the European setting and 
differ from the ones obtained by Krafft et al. (2014), who found a positive significant 
relationship between firm’s governance ratings and different metrics of firm performance. 
This could be explained not only by the different dataset and updated commercial indexes 
used in our regressions, but also by our set of control variables, in particular the 
introduction of lagged performance metrics in our models.  
The remainder of the paper will follow accordingly: in the next section, we review 
previous research on the relationship between governance ratings and performance and 
present several testable hypotheses. In section three, we develop the methodology where 
both the data sample and the research design are explained. Finally, we present and 
discuss the results as well as conclusions drawn from the study in sections four and five 
respectively.  
4.3. Background and hypothesis development 
We discuss one strand of academic literature that deals with the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. The growing use of diverse governance 
measures as proxies for quality of governance, and the extended belief that such 
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advantage will act as a catalyst for enhanced firm performance has emerged as a 
meaningful line of investigation. Research has revealed that high quality of governance 
typically leads to enhanced performance. 
Internal governance mechanisms have received most of attention in this line of research. 
A short list of papers dealing with the influence of particular governance provisions on 
performance should include: Lewellen et al. (1992) on executive compensation; Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) on board structure and incentives; Perez-Gonzalez (2006) on the 
impact of management selection, among others.  
The study of this relationship has also generated considerable interest through two other 
distinctive lines of research differentiated by the nature of the governance index used: 1) 
studies which build their own ratings (so-called academic indexes), or 2) studies using 
governance ratings developed by rating agencies (commercial governance indexes). 
While the bulk of the first group of studies using academic indexes reveals a positive 
significant relationship between governance and firm performance, the second line of 
research has yielded non-conclusive results.  
Among the papers focusing on scholar-built governance scores, we can mention the well-
known paper of Gompers et al. (2003). They created a governance index (G-index) based 
on a combination of 24 governance attributes collected by a leading consultant company, 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), for a large US sample. They 
observed that companies with weak corporate governance schemes consistently 
underperformed in the stock market. Also for a US context, Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
established a significant inverse relationship between their entrenchment (E-index) level 
and firm valuation. Bai et al. (2004), developed their G-index for a large sample of 
Chinese companies and found out that their research governance index had a direct 
significant effect on market valuation. 
We found only few studies addressing the association between governance and 
performance at a global scale, focused on academic governance ratings. Klapper and 
Love (2004) conducted research with a sample across 374 firms in 14 emerging markets. 
They built a GOV index using Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) governance 
reports from 2000. They found that quality of governance is associated with firm 
performance and stock return, particularly in countries with weak legal systems. 
A year later, Durnev and Kim (2005) validated Klapper and Love (2004)’s results. They 
carried out their research, building a governance index (COMP) based on the same 
governance practices’ scores released by CLSA from year 2000. They also contrasted 
those ratings by building a transparency index (TRAN) based on S&P corporate 
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disclosure ratings for 573 companies in 16 emerging markets and three developed 
economies in 2000. They found positive and statistically significant relationship between 
efficient governance practices and transparency and stock returns. As Klapper and Love 
(2004), they established that these relations are stronger in countries with poor legal 
environments. 
Then, Aggarwal et al. (2009), created their GOV index using information on 44 
governance attributes common to both US and foreign companies collected by ISS from 
2005. They used it to compare the internal governance of foreign firms versus comparable 
U.S. firms. They concluded that there are positive implications of that comparison for the 
value of the foreign firms. Finally, Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) addressed the 
governance-performance relationship using data on governance ratings from ISS for 
years 2003 through 2005 in a large cross-section of countries. They constructed a CG 
Index using 17 attributes of ISS governance scores, making a distinction between 
common governance attributes adopted to follow country standards and additional 
provisions embraced internally by firms. Their results indicated that improvements in 
corporate governance beyond country level are reflected in higher firm valuation (Tobin’s 
Q). 
Research on the interaction between governance proxied by commercial ratings and firm 
performance has been rather limited. However, more attention to this line of research has 
been taken place, because of growing reliance of investors and, in general, of market 
participants on these commercial ratings. Overall, the empirical evidence is mixed and 
inconclusive.  
Prior studies using commercial governance ratings have been generally conducted with 
US samples. Cheng and Wu (2006) studied the association between ISS’s CGQ ratings 
and TSR. They concluded that firms showing improvement in the overall quality of 
corporate governance exhibited stronger market returns.  Ertugrul and Hedge (2009) 
examined the predictive power of three leading commercial governance ratings and 
arrived to inconclusive results. Daines et al. (2010) contrasted three leading commercial 
ratings, including ISS scores, and obtained consistent weak results about their association 
with several metrics of performance. Furthermore, Núñez and Garcia-Blandon (2017), in 
their study of a sample of large European firms, failed to validate a consistent association 
between the tested ISS commercial ratings and firm performance. Finally, in the only 
paper analyzing commercial governance ratings at a global scale, Krafft et al. (2014) 
revisited the link between these ratings and performance to find out that the convergence 
of non-US firms to US best governance practices was a positive performance factor.  
Chapter 4. Commercial governance ratings as predictors… 
82 
 
Overall, despite the growing attention given to this line of research, prior studies have not 
arrived to a sound conclusion about the ability of commercial governance ratings to 
predict firm performance. Moreover, there is an obvious lack of research on this issue   in 
a global context. Our investigation intends to contribute to fill this gap. 
As discussed previously, commercial governance ratings are becoming a recurrent proxy 
for measuring the quality of governance. Based on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), a direct association between quality of governance and firm performance should 
be observed. Well-governed firms exhibit higher investor’s confidence on the back of 
higher management’s monitoring and disciplining. As a result, they are supposed to carry 
lower risk and enjoy lower cost of capital, which should translate into higher valuation 
and performance. 
We address the importance of commercial governance ratings by determining whether 
differences in these ratings are associated to variations in performance that have not been 
captured by other firm characteristics. Accordingly, the following null hypothesis has 
been posed: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Quality of governance, measured by QScore, is positively and 
significantly associated with firm performance.  
 
Taking into consideration the combined nature of QScore rating, as Núñez and Garcia-
Blandon (2017) we also test the main governance categories. We have no objection at the 
way ISS has pooled the wide array of governance attributes in these four main categories, 
as we also believe that they represent the most critical areas in relation to a successful 
corporate governance. This leads to our sub-group of testable hypotheses on the 
association between the four main governance category ratings and performance that we 
discuss below. 
Regulators usually highlight the critical role of board of directors in supervising the firm 
decision-making process. Research has also been particularly rich at studying this 
important governance category. Monks (2001) argued that board overseeing could 
improve the managerial process and lead to stronger performance. Beiner et al. (2006) 
found a positive relation between board size and performance. If superior board oversight 
minimizes managerial entrenchment, reduces management misappropriation of resources 
and increases accountability, then we expect the firm to show higher performance. 
Accordingly, we pose Hypothesis 1.1 as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1.1. Quality of governance, measured by BoardStructure, is positively 
and significantly associated with firm performance. 
 
Prior literature generally posits that good compensation practices provide support for 
stronger corporate performance. Based on past research (Morck et al., 1988), equity 
ownership and financial incentives align shareholders and managers’ interests, having a 
positive impact on performance. Also, Mehran (1995), among others, have provided 
evidence supporting a strong impact of management compensation practices on 
performance. Accordingly, we pose Hypothesis 1.2. as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1.2. Quality of governance, measured by Compensation, is positively 
and significantly associated with firm performance. 
 
Similar to the compensation category, we expect the protection of minority shareholder 
rights provisions to relate to performance because they are directly link to shareholders' 
wealth. We, therefore, expect a positive association between shareholder rights and 
performance. The importance of shareholders’ protection for the company’s prospects 
has been broadly documented in the literature. According to Bebchuk et al. (2009), there 
is a negative and significant relationship between the level of management entrenchment 
and both firm valuation and market returns. Large managerial ownership could also 
encourage entrenchment, negatively affecting firm performance (Stulz, 1988). 
Accordingly, we pose Hypothesis 1.3. as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1.3. Quality of governance, measured by ShareRights, is positively 
and significantly associated with firm performance. 
 
While boards of directors are responsible for monitoring the firm decision-making 
process, this duty is usually delegated in the audit committee. The audit committee 
practices are critical at influencing the financial reporting process, enforcing transparency 
and financial disclosure to the different internal and external stakeholders. Brown and 
Caylor (2006) and Bowen et al. (2008) established a direct relationship between the 
composition and ability of the audit committee and firm performance. Hence, if audit 
practices play such a critical role in the firm’s financial process, we can then anticipate 
that they should be also associated with stronger firm performance. Accordingly, we pose 
Hypothesis 1.4. as follows: 




Hypothesis 1.4. Quality of governance, measured by Audit, is positively and 
significantly associated with firm performance. 
 
4.4. Research Design 
In order to highlight the relationship between the commercial governance ratings and 
performance, we estimate the model given by Equation (1) below, with ordinary least 
squares. 
PERFORMANCE = α + β QScore + γ Z  + ε ,  (1) 
 
where dependent variable PERFORMANCE stands for the four different performance 
proxies (TQ, ROA, ROE and TSR) that we utilize in our models. Our main independent 
variable is the QScore. We also test for the four main categories of the index: 
BoardStructure, Compensation, ShareRights and Audit. Finally, we also include the usual 
control variables (Z) used in prior research (Yermack, 1996; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
We also add the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, which represents 
an important distinction from mainstream empirical studies on this subject. 
4.4.1. Performance metrics 
As stressed by Dalton et al. (2003) in a meta-analysis of these studies, there is no 
agreement about appropriate performance measures to use for testing this relationship. 
Studies on this line of research typically use either market –based performance ratios or 
accounting metrics to evaluate the association with performance.  
Similar to previous work in the corporate governance literature (Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997; La Porta et al., 2002), we estimate TQ as the market value of assets (calculated as 
book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) divided by 
the book value of assets.  We measure ROA as the ratio of operating income to total assets 
(see Larcker and Richardson, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). ROE is defined as net 
income divided by the book value of common equity. Following Hutchinson (2002), the 
one-year TSR comprises the capital gain (percentage change in share price), plus the 
dividend yield (calculated as the ratio of dividends per share and the initial share price).  
4.4.2. Independent (governance) measures 
As mentioned earlier, the corporate governance data are obtained from ISS, which 
produces governance ratings for thousands of firms internationally. This leading 
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consultant agency launched their first governance index in 2002 labeled the Corporate 
Governance Quotient (CGQ). Its newest version, the Quickscore, was first provided in 
2013, with the index now in its third version (Quickscore 3.0, as of 2015). This aggregate 
index is a relative measure of a firm’s governance risk and shows the relative governance 
quality of the company in relation to its industry peers. In constructing the governance 
ratings, ISS rates firms according to more than 200 different attributes, based on criteria 
that can be classified into four main categories: (1) board structure (BoardStructure), (2) 
compensation (Compensation), (3) shareholder rights (ShareRights), and (4) audit 
practices (Audit). Eq. (1) covers all five governance metrics to account for the composite 
QScore as well as for the four partial ratings.  
ISS uses proprietary weights in their QScore calculation, acknowledging that some 
factors could weight more on the index than others.  For each category and the aggregate 
index, ratings range from 1 to 10 scale with ones increments, with lower scores denoting 
lower governance risk relative to the index (better corporate governance). Further 
information can be found in the brochures released by ISS.14 
4.4.3. Control variables 
Both governance and performance are likely to be correlated with other firm 
characteristics. Thus, to add robustness to our results and to mitigate the problem of 
possible endogeneity we add an appropriate set of control variables consistent with prior 
studies (Yermack, 1996; Aggarwal et al., 2009; Núñez and Garcia-Blandon, 2017). We 
use the following set of control variables for the estimation of our models in Eq. (1). 
Firm age (LOGAGE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since 
the incorporation of the firm. We expect a negative association with performance. 
According to Fama and French (2004), performance is likely to deteriorate in older firms, 
seemingly due to a worsening of corporate governance quality, among other factors. Firm 
size (ASSETS), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets is expected to show an 
inverse relationship with performance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), large 
firms are more prone to deal with greater agency problems on the back of larger free cash 
flows. In addition, they tend to be in matured industries with low returns and potential.  
Firm growth opportunities (GROWTH), is computed as the average annual sales growth 
over the past three years, as suggested by Klapper and Love (2004). Companies with solid 
growth prospects usually hire better management teams and show higher performance 
(Core et al., 1999). We also include financial leverage (DEBT) and expect a positive 
                                                          
14 See ISS Quickscore 3.0, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/(last visited February, 2018) 
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association with performance. One of main benefits of debt pledges according to agency 
theory is to impose a higher degree of transparency, monitoring and accountability to 
management teams (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), we calculate DEBT as the sum of firm’s book value of long-term debt and the 
current portion of long-term debt divided by total assets.  
Past performance is also added to further control for a possible endogeneity. Thus, in each 
estimation we include the corresponding one-year lagged independent variable among 
the control variables. We also use the S&P Global Index industry classification to group 
firms into 11 industry clusters to control for industry fixed effects in the regressions. 
Finally, we run the regressions with country dummies to control for the effects of country-
specific characteristics. Similar to prior studies, we winsorize extreme (1st and 99th) 
percentiles of the pooled distribution of all variables in Eq. (1) to neutralize the impact of 
possible spurious outliers. 
4.4.4. Dataset 
This study uses primary data (governance variables) compiled and released in 2015 by 
the ISS. Our sample of companies includes the constituents of the Standard and Poor’s 
Global 1200 Index that have been covered by ISS. We started with 1149 firms with non-
missing accounting data, but 46 companies were dropped due to lack of information for 
at least one variable in Eq. (1). As a result, our final sample consists of 1103 firms.  
All dependent variables in Eq. (1) are moved forward one year (2016) to reduce the 
potential endogeneity of the model without significantly affecting the power of 
regressions. Realistically, implementation of good governance recommendations may 
have some delayed effect on firm performance. Table 1 presents a summary of all the 
variable names, codes, brief descriptions, and sources of data. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
As reflected in Table 2, the 1103 observations represent firms from 28 countries grouped 
in two main legal tradition blocks according to La Porta el al. (1998): 699 companies 
from 11 countries (corresponding to 63.37% of the sample) are grouped in the common 
law block (Common), while 404 companies from 17 countries (corresponding to 36.63%) 
in the civil law block (Civil). 
Insert Table 2 around here 
Table 3 provides a sector breakdown of the firms in our sample. The companies included 
in our research database operate in a diversity of industries: Consumer Discretionary 
(158), Consumer Staples (86), Energy (73), Financials (168), Healthcare (88), Industrials 
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(192), Information Technology (97), Materials (101), Real Estate (51), 
Telecommunication Services (28) and Utilities (61). 
Insert Table 3 around here 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sample of companies (means, 
medians, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values) for the variables 
included in Eq. (1). The figures indicate that there is an overall medium quality of 
governance among companies in our dataset (corresponding to a mean QScore of 4.82). 
BoardStructure, Compensation, and ShareRights pillars have similar results with means 
in the 4.46-4.74 range. Companies perform best in Audit practices with a mean of 2.47 
and median of 1.00 (highest quality) for the overall dataset. Firm size averages $10.0 
billion while the leverage’s mean is around 23.7%. Moreover, the average TQ, ROA, ROE 
and TSR are 1.71, 7.16%, 13.2% and 10.4% respectively.  
Insert Table 4 around here 
Table 5 displays the univariate analysis of mean and median differences of our research 
variables for the two main blocks according to segmentation by legal tradition. To 
measure the statistical level of significance of mean and median differences for both 
blocks, we conduct the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test respectively. The results reveal 
some degree of diversity.  
Companies in the Civil block rank higher in terms of overall governance quality (lower 
QScore mean and median).  These differences are statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level. We gain more insight into the variety of corporate governance by 
examining the four governance pillars. The Civil block also shows lower ratings (higher 
quality) in BoardStructure and Compensation. For the latter, the values are statistically 
significant. However, the Common block leads in the other two pillars (ShareRights and 
Audit practices), reflecting lower ratings (higher quality). The values for Audit are 
statistically significant. Contrary to prior literature, these findings somehow contradict 
the established notion of clear leadership of the Anglo-American (common law) model 
of corporate governance as highlighted by La Porta et al. (1998). 
In terms of firm performance, the Common block shows a clear leadership, with the 
values for TQ, ROA, ROE and TSR higher and statistically significant.  As for the control 
variables, firms in the Civil block appear to be older (higher LOGAGE values), larger 
(higher ASSETS values), and lead in terms of growth potential (larger GROWTH values). 
The Common region exhibits a higher level of leverage (higher DEBT values). All 
differences except GROWTH are statistically significant.  
Insert Table 5 around here 
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Table 6 provides Pearson correlation coefficients with significance values for the 
variables in Eq. (1). As expected, QScore correlates with the four main governance pillars 
(BoardStructure, Compensation, ShareRights and Audit). We also analyze the correlation 
between each pair of categories to rule out any potential substitution effect between 
governance main features. We find no significant negative correlation, suggesting that 
the main four governance pillars are not substitutes.  
Regarding the correlation between our performance metrics and governance variables, 
we observe a significant positive correlation between our aggregate governance rating 
QScore and TQ. It also applies to the four main governance pillars, with the exception of 
the Audit category, for which we observe a significant but negative correlation. The 
positive correlations indicate that higher governance ratings (weaker governance quality) 
should translate into higher firm performance, which is inconsistent with our hypotheses. 
Only for the audit pillar, the negative sign is consistent with our expectations. Morevoer, 
no significant correlation is found between QScore and the remaining performance 
metrics. In another surprising result, the BoardStructure rating is positive and 
significantly correlated with all performance variables, except with the TSR, contradicting 
our Hypothesis 1.1. This means that higher scores (weaker board structures) should 
translate into higher firm performance. The Audit rating reflects the expected negative 
significant correlation with all performance variables, indicating that higher scores 
(weaker audit practices) are consistent with lower performance. On the other hand, not 
surprisingly, performance metrics by a large extent are highly correlated among them.  
Regarding the control variables, QScore and the main categories (except Audit) show a 
significant negative correlation with ASSETS and GROWTH. As expected, a positive 
significant correlation between the governance ratings and lagged performance variables 
is also registered. The other correlations are generally much lower, not suggesting serious 
multicollinearity in our dataset.   
Insert Table 6 around here 
4.5. Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of the estimations of Eq. (1). We are 
aware of the fact that the number of factors included by ISS to compute the governance 
scores vary among sub-regions and countries. To make QScore equivalent across 
companies, we follow ISS’s regional breakdown to allow for comparison within markets 
where governance practices are similar. Therefore, we have standardized these ratings at 
the sub-regional or country level, rescaling the scores to have a mean of zero and a 
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standard deviation of one. As the Breusch-Pagan test suggests heteroscedasticity in our 
dataset, we conduct significant tests with robust standard errors.15  
For Eq. (1), six models are estimated. In Model 1, we study the primary relationship 
between QScore and our four proxies of performance. To evaluate the separate impact of 
each of the four main governance categories, in Models 2-5 we replace QScore by each 
of the partial ratings (BoardStructure, Compensation, ShareRights and Audit). In Model 
6, we test for the four pillars together as independent variables to measure their joint 
impact on firm performance metrics. Tables 7 through 10 report the results of the 
regressions of the six models for the four performance metrics.  
Table 7 reports our first set of results of the estimation of Eq. (1) with TQ as the proxy 
for performance. All six models are globally significant with 92% adjusted R-squared. 
The main result is the absence of any significant relationship between QScore and TQ, as 
reflected in Model 1, as well as for all partial ratings (Models 2-5). This relationship 
remains non-significant when the four main categories are simultaneously tested in Model 
6, similar to Klein et al. (2005), Daines et al. (2010), and Núñez and Garcia-Blandon 
(2017). 
As for control variables, we find a significantly inverse relationship between TQ and 
ASSETS in all models. This indicates that larger firms exhibit lower performance as 
measured by TQ, consistent with our prediction. Similarly, there is negative significant 
relationship between TQ and GROWTH in our six models, contradicting our expectations. 
Finally, we also observe the expected significant direct relationship with lagged 
performance (TQ(t-1)) in all six models.  
Insert Table 7 around here 
Table 8 depicts the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) with ROA as the dependent variable. 
As in the previous case, all four models are globally significant with high explanatory 
power (adjusted R-squared of 87%). Model 1 shows again a non-significant relationship 
between QScore and performance, this time proxied by ROA, similar to Epps and Cereola 
(2008). As for the partial ratings, we report a significant association with Compensation, 
for which we observe the expected negative sign, consistent with Hypothesis 1.2. Hence, 
firms with higher Compensation scores (weaker compensation practices) exhibit weaker 
performance as measured by ROA. This relationship remains significant in Model 6 when 
we analyze all governance categories combined. Also in Model 6, the relationship 
between BoardStructure and ROA turns significant at the 10% significance level. 
                                                          
15 As a rule, we do not deliver the specific mark for the usual significant levels (0.01 or 0.05). 
Chapter 4. Commercial governance ratings as predictors… 
90 
 
However, the positive sign of this association contradicts our Hypothesis 1.1, reflecting 
that firms with higher BoardStructure ratings (weaker board practices) exhibit stronger 
performance as measured by ROA. In terms of the control variables, ASSETS reflects 
again a significantly inverse relationship with performance (ROA), while the significant 
relationship for GROWTH turns positive this time, confirming our expectations in both 
cases. In addition, LOGAGE shows a positive significant association with ROA at the 
10% significance level, contradicting our expectations. We report significant results for 
the influence of prior performance (ROA(t-1)) with the predicted positive sign. 
Insert Table 8 around here 
Table 9 displays the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) with ROE as the dependent 
variable.  All six models are globally significant, although the explanatory power of the 
models is considerably lower than in the estimations conducted with TQ or ROA as the 
proxies for performance (adjusted R-squared of 57%). According to the results for Model 
1, the relationship between QScore and ROE is non-significant. In addition, no significant 
relationship is shown between any of the partial ratings and ROE, except for 
BoardStructure that reveals a positive association with performance (ROE) at the 10% 
significance level.  This relationship remains significant at the 10% significance level 
with the unexpected positive sign when we introduce the partial ratings altogether in 
Model 6. This contradicts our Hypothesis 1.1, conveying that firms with higher 
BoardStructure scores (weaker board practices) exhibit stronger performance as 
measured by ROE. 
As for control variables, we confirm the significant direct influence of past year 
performance (ROE(t-1)) on current performance. We also report again a significantly 
inverse relationship between ASSETS and performance (ROE) in all models at the 10% 
significance level, as predicted. 
Insert Table 9 around here 
Table 10 displays the results of the estimation of Eq. (1) with TSR as the dependent 
variable. Although all six estimations are globally significant, the explanatory power of 
the proposed model is rather low (adjusted R-squared of 29%) if compared with the 
former estimations.  According to the results for Model 1, the relationship between 
QScore and TSR is non-significant. In addition, no significant relationship is observed 
between any of the partial ratings and TSR.  
As for control variables, we observe a significantly inverse relationship between the level 
of leverage (DEBT) and performance measured by TSR, contradicting our expectations. 
We also report a negative influence of lagged performance (TSR(t-1)) on current 
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performance. This result could be explained by the overreactions of stock markets, which 
encourages the so-called contrary investment strategies (Chan, 1988).  
Insert Table 10 around here 
In summary, results show that commercial governance ratings are not good predictors for 
performance.  In addition, the governance categories also show no significant impact on 
firm performance after controlling for other firm characteristics, past performance, and 
the sector effect. It should be noticed that, unlike Krafft et al. (2014), we control for past 
performance, and this could explain the different results we obtain compared to Krafft et 
al. (2014). In all models the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are positive and 
significant, indicating that dynamics play a relevant role in this relationship. 
We also conduct a battery of additional tests to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions 
(results untabulated).16 Firstly, we run a similar analysis for a subsample of firms 
excluding Financials and Real Estate firms (219 companies) due to their distinctive 
corporate governance structures and accounting practices, resulting in a cluster consisting 
of 884 companies. In general, results using this non-financial subsample are qualitatively 
similar to those presented for the entire set of firms.  
Following Núñez and Garcia-Blandon (2017), as a natural extension of this research, in 
another robustness check, we segregate the firms in the sample according to the quality 
of governance (QScore). We follow Gomper et al. (2003)’s portfolio approach and 
classify our sample of 1103 firms as being “good” quality (low risk) of governance 
(QScore from 1 to 3), “medium” quality (medium risk) of governance (QScore from 4 to 
7), and “poor” quality (high risk) of governance (QScore from 8 to 10). Almost half of 
the companies (49%) are at the “medium” governance practices level, 29% of the firms 
are at the “good” governance practice level, while firms with “poor” governance represent 
the remaining 22% of the sample. This would enable to conduct sensitive sequential 
estimations for the extreme “poor” and “good” quality of governance clusters. All the 
estimations fail to validate a significant relationship between QScore and performance. 
We also do not observe a significant relationship between any of main four governance 
pillars and performance (results untabulated). 
Similar to Krafft et al. (2014), we ran our models excluding the lagged performance 
metrics. In this test, the association between our major QScore rating turns significantly 
negative when we use ROA as a proxy for performance, signaling that high QScore ratings 
(lower governance quality) will have a negative impact on performance measured by 
                                                          
16 Results for this set of robustness checks are not reported in tables. However, they are available upon request. 
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ROA. Similarly, we also find sporadic and occasionally contradictory influences of 
certain governance categories on performance when we exclude the lagged performance 
metrics. This highlights the importance of controlling for past performance when testing 
this governance quality-firm performance association. It could also contribute to explain 
the differences between our results and Krafft et al.’s (2014). 
In the last check, we control for the fact that several countries are openly underrepresented 
in our sample. Accordingly, we rerun all models excluding countries with fewer than 
three firms. None of these arrangements changes the results. Overall, the robustness tests 
provide support to the results reported in the main analysis regarding the lack of 
association between commercial governance ratings and performance.  
4.6. Additional analysis: the importance of a country’s legal tradition 
As previously stated, research points to a country's legal tradition as important 
determinant of corporate governance practices. Common law countries tend to protect 
and enforce investors’ rights stronger than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Hence, we cannot take for granted that the set of governance mechanisms work the same 
in both systems. Then, we should not accept that the results obtained in countries whose 
legal tradition is based on the common law (mostly Anglo-Saxon countries) can be 
directly extrapolated to civil law countries. Therefore, the influence of the legal tradition 
is not only a valid explanation for corporate governance differences but also for variances 
in firm performance across countries (Levine, 1999). Accordingly, following the analysis 
conducted with the whole sample, we perform additional analyses for the segmentation 
of our sample based on the firm’s legal origin. 
Table 11 shows the results for our Hypothesis 1 (Model 1) for the two legal origin blocks. 
In the case of the analysis for the Common block, the results for Model 1 show no 
significant relationship between QScore and performance as measured by any of our 
performance indicators. Thus, results for Model 1 would not support Hypothesis 1. As 
for the partial ratings covered in Model 2-6 (results untabulated), we also do not observe 
any significant results for any of the ratings in any of the estimations.  
Focusing on the Civil block, as in the case of the Common block, results for the aggregate 
governance rating QScore in Model 1 show a non-significant relationship with any of the 
four performance metrics analyzed, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1. As for the partial 
ratings, we do not observe any significant results for any of the ratings, except for the 
Compensation category (Model 3) that reflects a significant relationship with all our 
performance metrics. This significant relationship between Compensation and 
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performance remains when we analyze the combined effect of all four pillars in Model 6. 
The negative sign of this relationship follows our predictions, meaning that firms with 
higher Compensation scores (weaker compensation practices) exhibit weaker 
performance. This is consistent with some empirical research examining this particular 
relationship for civil law countries. Basu et al. (2007), in a study of Japanese firms, found 
that excess pay and weaker compensation practices are negatively related to accounting 
performance. 
These results at the region level, are globally consistent with the evidence reported by 
Núñez and Garcia-Blandon (2017) for the European setting.  In general, results for Model 
1 would not support a positive relationship between commercial ratings scores and 
performance (Hypothesis 1) in any of the two legal tradition blocks. However, the only 
of such positive relationship that was statistically validated in Núñez and Garcia-Blandon 
(2017)’s European study, observed between QScore and ROA for the Civil region, does 
not materialize for our broader sample.   
Insert Table 11 around here 
4.7. Summary and conclusion 
The question of how corporate governance relates to firm performance has captured a 
considerable attention from scholars, regulators, and market participants alike. An 
increasing number of investors are incorporating commercial governance ratings in their 
decision-making process, as a proxy for corporate governance and predictors of firm-
level performance. It thus seems logical to wonder whether market participants should 
rely on these ratings for such important task. In this investigation, we examine the 
association between quality of governance through the leading governance rating 
Quickscore and firm performance as well as the interaction with the country legal 
environment, in order to confirm if such assumed positive association does materialize.  
While some papers have investigated this issue before, only in one case has been 
addressed it in a purely global setting. Using a large global database allows us to tackle 
the sample bias problem associated to majority of studies on this line of research we have 
further extended the analysis of commercial governance ratings as a contributing factor 
of firm performance carried out by Núñez and García-Blandón (2017) which look at the 
impact of governance on firm performance in a European setting. Similar to them, our 
analysis yields little evidence supporting the widespread hypothesis of a positive 
association between corporate governance and firm performance after controlling for 
other firm measures that prior research has shown to be related to performance.  
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Although our main interest is on the aggregate scores of the governance ratings, we also 
study the relationship between partial scores relative to board structure, compensation, 
shareholder rights and audit practices, and performance. Moreover, in order to provide 
sounder results, our research considers several metrics of performance. However, the lack 
of association detected between governance and performance generally survives all 
different performance measures and robustness tests. Only in one particular case was this 
relationship validated with the expected sign: the inverse association between 
Compensation and ROA, signaling the negative influence of low-quality compensation 
practices (higher ratings) on the company´s performance (Hypothesis 1.2). In the case of 
the association between BoardStructure and ROA or ROE, the positive sign of this 
relation contradicts our Hypothesis 1.1. 
The literature suggests that quality of corporate governance could differ among, most 
notably, legal origin. We have performed segmented analyses with the two major groups 
of firms (Civil and Common) that have yielded steady results, increasing our confidence 
in the absence of a significant relationship between the tested ratings and performance. 
Only for the Civil region, we again find a significant negative relationship between the 
Compensation ratings and all metrics of performance, consistent with our prediction in 
Hypothesis 1.2. 
We consider that our empirical findings have interesting implications for corporate 
governance research and practice. First, how governance is measured matters. While 
these commercial ratings constitute, in theory, a widely used proxy for the corporate 
governance quality, its tangible role remains subject to criticism. Our results also reveal 
that they are hardly relevant in predicting performance. Moreover, the similarities 
between our results and Núñez and García-Blandón’s (2017) with a dated version of 
Quickscore might put into question the claimed improvements in the construction of the 
latest versions of commercial governance ratings. 
Bohren and Odegaard (2006) question the benefits of gathering a large number of 
governance factors and highlighted that only a limited number of governance provisions 
matter to firm performance. Our findings somehow seem to point in this direction and 
highlight the challenges faced by rating agencies at developing reliable measures of 
corporate governance quality. We also believe that regulators and policy makers should 
enforce the design of more efficient tools to measure corporate governance, since these 
commercial ratings seem to have limited effectiveness. Moreover, investors and 
supporters of commercial governance ratings in general should cautiously take note of 
this weak association when trying to pick best performers.  
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In addition, since our main conclusion somehow contradicts Krafft et al.’s (2014) and the 
mostly positive effects reported in the literature, it clearly encourages further research on 
this issue. On the other hand, our results suggest that in order to strengthen the models, 
they should consider the dynamics from lagged performance. We show that when these 
lagged dependent metrics and a larger set of control variables are included in the model, 
each has an important role to play. 
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Table 1. Description of variables used in the empirical research 
Variable Code Definition Data Source 
Corporate Governance Variables     
Quickscore QScore 
Aggregate CG Score rating provided by ISS from 
2015 ISS 
Board Structure BoardStructure 
The Board Structure category rating as provided by 
ISS from 2015 ISS 
Compensation Compensation 
The Compensation category rating as provided by 
ISS from 2015 ISS 
Shareholders Rights ShareRights 
The Shareholders' rights category rating as provided 
by ISS from 2015 ISS 
Audit Practices Audit 
The Auditing practices category rating as provided 
by ISS from 2015 ISS 
Variables for Company Performance     
Tobin´s Q TQ 
Division of of the market value of assets (calculated 
as book value of assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity) by the book value of 
assets in 2016. 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Return on Assets  ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets in 2016 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Return on Equity  ROE 
Quotient of net income divided by the book value of 
common equity  in 2016 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Total Shareholders Return  TSR 
Quotient of the sum of company´s annual stock 
price change plus dividend payments all divided by 
stock price at the beginning of year 2016. 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Control Variables       
Firm´s listing age  LOGAGE 
Number of years passed since the firm´s founding 
year until 2016 (natural logarithm) 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Firm Size  ASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets in 2016 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Growth Opportunity  GROWTH Average Sales Growth in the last 3 years (2014-16) 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Level of Leverage  DEBT 
[Long Term Debt plus current portion of Long Term 
Debt/ Total Assets] in 2016 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Tobin´s Q (t-1) TQ(t-1) Tobin´s Q in 2015 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Return on Assets (t-1) ROA(t-1) ROA in 2015 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
Return on Equity (t-1) ROE(t-1) ROE in 2015 
S&P Capital 
IQ 
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Table 2. Dataset break down by corporate governance legal origin blocks 
Legal Origin Blocks Country Companies Percent 
 Australia 47              4.26  
 Bermuda 2              0.18  
 Canada 58              5.26  
 Hong Kong 11              1.00  
 Ireland 18              1.63  
Common Law Macau 1              0.09  
 Papua New Guinea 1              0.09  
 Singapore 4              0.36  
 Taiwan 1              0.09  
 United Kingdom 96              8.70  
 United States 460            41.70  
    699             63.37  
 Austria 3              0.27  
 Belgium 9              0.82  
 Brazil 15              1.36  
 Denmark 11              1.00  
 Finland 9              0.82  
 France 43              3.90  
 Germany 38              3.45  
 Italy 16              1.45  
 Japan 141            12.78  
Civil Law Luxembourg 5              0.45  
 Netherlands 19              1.72  
 Norway 6              0.54  
 Portugal 2              0.18  
 South Korea 12              1.09  
 Spain 19              1.72  
 Sweden 22              1.99  
 Switzerland 34              3.08  
                    404             36.63  




Table 3.  Dataset breakdown by sectors  
Sectors Companies Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 158 14.32 
Consumer Staples 86 7.8 
Energy 73 6.62 
Financials 168 15.23 
Healthcare 88 7.98 
Industrials 192 17.41 
Information Technology 97 8.79 
Materials 101 9.16 
Real Estate 51 4.62 
Telecommunication Services 28 2.54 
Utilities 61 5.53 
Total 1103 100.00 
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Table 4.  Dataset descriptive statistics     
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Corporate Governance Variables       
QScore 1103 4.82 4 2.99 1 10 
BoardStructure 1103 4.74 4 2.93 1 10 
Compensation 1103 4.66 4 2.82 1 10 
ShareRights 1103 4.46 4 3.22 1 10 
Audit 1103 2.47 1 2.69 1 10 
Company Performance Variables       
TQ 1103 1.71 1.46 0.72 0.99 3.16 
ROA 1103 7.16 6.40 5.08 0.00 16.00 
ROE 1103 13.20 11.60 10.00 -1.25 32.40 
TSR 1103 10.40 9.44 17.00 -14.70 38.70 
Control Variables             
LOGAGE 1103 4.21 4.39 0.68 3.04 5.07 
ASSETS 1103 10.00 9.84 1.17 8.46 12.10 
GROWTH 1103 3.38 3.02 7.39 -8.90 16.10 
DEBT 1103 23.70 23.10 14.00 3.19 46.80 
TQ(t-1) 1103 1.70 1.43 0.73 0.98 3.17 
ROA(t-1) 1103 7.38 6.53 5.25 0.00 16.40 
ROE(t-1) 1103 12.90 11.60 10.20 -3.82 30.80 
TSR(t-1) 1103 3.41 3.76 19.40 -28.30 33.70 
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Table 5.  Univariate analysis of mean and median differences of research variables by 
legal tradition 
 Mean Significance Median Significance 
Variables Common Civil t-test Common Civil MW 
Corporate Governance Variables     
QScore 4.94 4.61 * 5 4 * 
BoardStructure 4.85 4.56  5 4  
Compensation 4.95 4.16 *** 5 4 *** 
ShareRights 4.45 4.49  5 4  
Audit 2.09 3.12 *** 1 1 *** 
Company Performance Variables     
TQ 1.83 1.49 *** 1.61 1.23 *** 
ROA 7.68 6.27 *** 7.11 5.80 *** 
ROE 14.30 11.30 *** 12.80 10.10 *** 
TSR 13.10 5.86 *** 12.90 1.39 *** 
Control Variables             
LOGAGE 4.15 4.33 *** 4.26 4.52 *** 
ASSETS 9.91 10.20 *** 9.75 10 *** 
GROWTH 3.16 3.76   2.48 3.54 * 
DEBT 25.90 19.80 *** 25.80 18.1 *** 
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Table 6. Research variables correlation matrix 
  QScore BoardSt Compens ShRights Audit TQ ROA ROE TSR ASSETS LOGAGE GROWTH DEBT TQ(t-1) ROA(t-1) ROE(t-1) 
BoardSt 0.539* 1.00               
  0.00                
Compens 0.610* 0.276* 1.00              
  0.00 0.00               
ShRights 0.606* 0.249* 0.101* 1.00             
  0.00 0.00 0.00              
Audit 0.280* 0.067* 0.02 0.02 1.00            
  0.00 0.03 0.51 0.43                         
TQ 0.094* 0.114* 0.130* 0.0604* -0.124* 1.00           
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00            
ROA 0.04 0.118* 0.05 0.05 -0.109* 0.780* 1.00          
  0.14 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00           
ROE 0.01 0.066* 0.01 0.04 -0.111* 0.524* 0.610* 1.00         
  0.69 0.03 0.70 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00          
TSR 0.01 -0.02 0.085* -0.04 -0.082* 0.03 -0.070* -0.01 1.00        
  0.73 0.59 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.65                 
ASSETS -0.116* -0.112* -0.133* -0.067* 0.136* -0.528* -0.560* -0.220* 0.03 1.00       
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34        
LOGAGE -0.077* -0.106* -0.140* -0.02 0.04 -0.123* -0.09* -0.04 -0.01 0.184* 1.00      
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.75 0.00       
GROWTH 0.02 0.070* 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.105* 0.146* 0.154* -0.180* -0.02 -0.213* 1.00     
  0.57 0.02 0.65 0.50 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00      
DEBT -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.108* 0.106* 0.063* -0.01 -0.135* -0.161* 0.00 1.00    
  0.48 0.96 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.93     
TQ(t-1) 0.081* 0.100* 0.115* 0.05 -0.108* 0.951* 0.779* 0.532* -0.160* -0.518* -0.11* 0.188* 0.116* 1.00   
  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
ROA(t-1) 0.05 0.102* 0.086* 0.04 -0.142* 0.755* 0.922* 0.550* -0.110* -0.550* -0.097* 0.105* 0.105* 0.790*   
  0.10 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
ROE(t-1) 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.137* 0.484* 0.560* 0.730* -0.080* -0.205* -0.03 0.153* 0.062* 0.522* 0.610* 1.00 
  0.97 0.37 0.42 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00  
TSR(t-1) -0.06 0.01 -0.091* 0.00 0.00 0.229* 0.214* 0.190* -0.360* -0.090* 0.00 0.227* -0.084* 0.312* 0.165* 0.167* 
  0.05 0.78 0.00 0.89 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* p<0.05 
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Table 7.  Results on the influence of ISS QScore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q (TQ) 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
QScore 0.0031      
 (0.60)      
BoardStructure  0.0088    0.0091 
  (0.18)    (0.18) 
Compensation   0.000024   -0.0017 
   (1.00)   (0.81) 
ShareRights    0.0034  0.0020 
    (0.61)  (0.77) 
Audit     -0.0052 -0.0055 
     (0.43) (0.41) 
LOGAGE -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0038 
 (0.71) (0.74) (0.68) (0.69) (0.68) (0.72) 
ASSETS -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GROWTH -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DEBT -0.056 -0.055 -0.058 -0.057 -0.058 -0.054 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.38) 
TQ(t-1) 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Companies (N) 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 
F-Statistic 280.6*** 281.0*** 280.5*** 280.6*** 280.7*** 262.2*** 
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Notes: Results are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 8.  Results on the influence of ISS QScore governance ratings on performance as 
measured as measured by ROA 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
QScore -0.00050      
 (0.38)      
BoardStructure  0.00061    0.00097* 
  (0.28)    (0.09) 
Compensation   -0.0013**   -0.0016** 
   (0.03)   (0.01) 
ShareRights    -0.00016  -0.00020 
    (0.80)  (0.76) 
Audit     0.00035 0.00045 
     (0.65) (0.57) 
LOGAGE 0.0017* 0.0018* 0.0015 0.0017* 0.0017* 0.0016* 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
ASSETS -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GROWTH 0.00030*** 0.00030*** 0.00031*** 0.00030*** 0.00031*** 0.00031*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DEBT 0.00021 0.00083 -0.00030 0.00051 0.00056 -0.00026 
 (0.97) (0.87) (0.95) (0.92) (0.92) (0.96) 
ROA(t-1) 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.025*** 0.024** 0.026*** 0.024** 0.024** 0.026*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Companies (N) 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 
F-Statistic 162.4*** 162.5*** 163.1*** 162.3*** 162.4*** 152.6*** 
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Notes: Results are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9.   Results on the influence of ISS QScore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by ROE 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
QScore 0.00053      
 (0.81)      
BoardStructure  0.0036*    0.0040* 
  (0.09)    (0.07) 
Compensation   -0.0017   -0.0028 
   (0.41)   (0.20) 
ShareRights    0.0017  0.0013 
    (0.40)  (0.53) 
Audit     0.00096 0.0010 
     (0.67) (0.65) 
LOGAGE 0.00078 0.0010 0.00044 0.00075 0.00072 0.00063 
 (0.83) (0.78) (0.91) (0.84) (0.84) (0.86) 
ASSETS -0.0040* -0.0039* -0.0041* -0.0039* -0.0041* -0.0040* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
GROWTH 0.00032 0.00029 0.00033 0.00033 0.00033 0.00032 
 (0.42) (0.46) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) 
DEBT 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 
 (0.46) (0.43) (0.51) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) 
ROE(t-1) 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.073** 0.072** 0.075** 0.073** 0.075** 0.075** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Companies (N) 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 
F-Statistic 32.3*** 32.5*** 32.4*** 32.4*** 32.3*** 30.4*** 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Notes: Results are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Results on the influence of ISS QScore governance ratings on performance as 
measured by TSR 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 
QScore -0.0031      
 (0.50)      
BoardStructure  -0.0022    -0.0010 
  (0.64)    (0.83) 
Compensation   -0.00033   0.00069 
   (0.94)   (0.88) 
ShareRights    -0.0069  -0.0068 
    (0.12)  (0.14) 
Audit     -0.0017 -0.0016 
     (0.70) (0.71) 
LOGAGE -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0050 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50) 
ASSETS 0.0063 0.0064 0.0065 0.0061 0.0066 0.0063 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) 
GROWTH -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
DEBT -0.096** -0.094** -0.093** -0.097** -0.093** -0.097** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
TSR(t-1) -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.077 0.074 0.074 0.077 0.072 0.075 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) 
Companies (N) 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 
F-Statistic 10.0*** 10.0*** 10.0*** 10.1*** 10.0*** 9.42*** 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Results are reported with robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 11. Results on the influence of ISS QScore governance ratings on performance 
(segmented by legal tradition) 
  TQ ROA ROE TSR 
  Common Civil Common Civil Common Civil Common Civil 
QScore 0.005 -0.0071 -0.00051 -0.00065 -0.0005 0.0019 -0.00059 -0.011 
  (0.545) (0.363) (0.481) (0.482) -0.857 (0.565) (0.917) (0.182) 
LOGAGE 0.00052 -0.0045 0.0023* 0.0006 0.0064 -0.0084 -0.0031 -0.017 
  (0.973) (0.734) (0.062) (0.685) (0.189) (0.138) (0.734) (0.174) 
ASSETS -0.030*** -0.024* -0.002** -0.0025* -0.0042 -0.0053 0.012* -0.0031 
  (0.001) (0.052) (0.010) (0.051) (0.127) (0.117) (0.055) (0.727) 
GROWTH -0.005*** -0.001 0.0003** 0.0005** 0.00044 0.00054 -0.001 -0.00058 
  (0.001) (0.573) (0.033) (0.015) (0.360) (0.432) (0.290) (0.697) 
DEBT -0.019 -0.19** 0.0073 -0.017** 0.037 -0.047 -0.053 -0.1 
  (0.816) (0.032) (0.318) (0.040) (0.160) (0.145) (0.259) (0.158) 
TQ/ROA/ROE/TSR  0.92*** 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.53*** -0.20*** -0.18*** 
(t-1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.39*** 0.50*** 0.019* 0.041** 0.037 0.19*** 0.032 0.13 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.099) (0.015) (0.335) (0.001) (0.679) (0.269) 
Companies (N) 699 404 699 404 699 404 699 404 
F-Statistic 258.6*** 198.4*** 172.5*** 144.3*** 37.0*** 17.6*** 9.75*** 6.08*** 
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.59 0.51 0.27 0.29 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       













Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute the main body of this investigation. These chapters had initially 
been proposed as independent studies on different approaches to evaluate the relationship 
between the quality of corporate governance and firm performance. The objective pursued 
in this final chapter is to highlight the main conclusions derived from the joint consideration 
of aspects related to the corporate governance-performance association, which have been 
treated separately in each of the aforementioned chapters.  
The main objective of this research has been to determine the impact on firm performance of 
the quality of corporate governance. The proposed models have been tested empirically for 
the Spanish, European and global setting. We have measured this quality of corporate 
governance through two of the main channels: commercial indexes widely used as a proxy 
for corporate governance, and the degree of compliance with the recommendations of a 
country's code. The results of this research must be associated, at least in part, with the fact 
that the proxies used constitute an imperfect representation of the corporate governance 
variable whose effect is to be measured.   
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First of all, in both Chapters 2 and 4, we do not 
find a consistent significant relationship between CGR and firm performance for our sample 
of large European and global firms respectively. Second, the results obtained in Chapter 3 
point to a weak impact on the performance of companies from the quality of corporate 
governance when measured through a compliance with local code recommendations. These 
results hold for the overall proxy of corporate governance as well as for the proxies that 
represent the main governance categories or areas of recommendations. Moreover, the lack 
of association detected between governance and performance generally survives all different 
performance measures and robustness tests.  
In Chapter 4, we have extended and refined the analysis performed in Chapter 2 on the 
European level, to the global scale. In addition to the worldwide nature of our sample, which 
is a distinction in this line of research, another differentiating feature of this study is that we 
simultaneously investigate the effects of the CGR on market and accounting metrics of 
performance. We also use the latest available version of leading ISS governance ratings. 
After controlling for sector, firm-specific attributes, and prior-performance, our empirical 




results indicate that corporate governance quality as measured by our governance CGR 
proxies is not an important element in shaping up the firm’s performance. Therefore, our 
findings call into question the usefulness of CGR marketed by influential consultant 
companies as predictors of performance.  
The literature suggests that quality of corporate governance could differ among, most 
notably, legal origin. After performing segmented analyses with the two major groups of 
firms (Civil and Common), we have found no empirical evidence of a significant relationship 
between governance and performance for any of these two regions. Our results at the region 
level, are globally consistent (Chapter 4) with the evidence reported for the European setting 
in Chapter 2.   
Considering the growing importance of CGR for companies and market participants, we 
believe that our empirical findings have also implications for corporate governance research 
and practice. First, our results question rating agencies’ vindication of these ratings, as they 
do not seem to create value for market participants. For that reason, we recommend that 
investors should make decisions based on CGR only with due reservations. Furthermore, our 
results should also encourage the providers of CGR to investigate on the causes of this lack 
of relationship in order to improve their design and to produce more accurate ratings.   
The results of the study in Chapter 3 might also have some practical implications, as they 
provide some indications of the ability of compliance with a governance code to predict 
performance for Spanish firms. From a more general point of view, it also contributes to the 
debate about the very usefulness of these governance codes. In addition, it also stresses the 
importance of country-specific issues (i.e., culture and business ethics, as well as the level of 
disclosure and outsiders’ difficulty to verify the information) to understand the compliance 
with the governance code-performance relationship and thus, the difficulties of generalizing 
country-specific evidence. On the other hand, our results suggest that in order to strengthen 
investor confidence, local regulators should be more active in penalizing poor explanations 
and make sure that the mandatory corporate governance reports do not become a mechanical 
tick-the-box exercise, jeopardizing the effectiveness of the “comply or explain” approach. 
A lesson to be learned from this investigation is that the effects of our proxies of corporate 
governance on performance seem to be weak, even after considering the dynamics from 
lagged performance. We show that when these lagged dependent metrics and a set of 




significant control variables are included in the model, each has an important role to play, as 
do their interactions. 
The limitations of the current study are represented by two major constraints: 1) the static 
nature of our cross-sectional estimations in Chapters 2 and 4, and 2) the composition of our 
sample data, consisted of major companies in terms of market capitalization and relatively 
homogenous in terms of size and age, for all datasets used. As a future avenue of research, 
we look to establish a panel data approach, by extending the time series to a minimum period 
of three years for our analyses in Chapters 2 and 4, allowing to build more robust 
relationships among critical variables. It is also recommended to run similar analyses (for 
Chapters 2 and 4) using other CGR. We should also expand our sample data beyond the very 
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